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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis focuses on law’s conception of trans* embodiment and explores how the 
treatment of trans* lives by law exposes the existentially limiting understandings of 
‘sex’ and ‘gender’ that underpin legal thinking. The thesis considers these limits on 
understanding to be problematic and limiting for the trans* community and uses 
theory to explore and advance a more appropriate and fluid scheme for legal 
recognition. Chapter one pays particular attention to the Gender Recognition Act 
2004. It will be argued that it is based on the idea of the ‘authentic transsexual’ which, 
in the case of the Act, is founded on the separation of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ and the 
construction of sex as dimorphic biological fact. Chapter two introduces and explores 
the idea of ‘becoming’ which can be used to re-figure what it means to be trans*. 
‘Becoming’ can de-essentialise trans* lives in law and path the way for a more 
transformatory and fluid politics of recognition. Chapter three introduces a model of 
recognition that could be introduced in Scotland that is responsive to the self 
understood in terms of ‘becoming’. It will be argued that the model of self-
identification and multiple gender scheme proposed balances trans* need for rights 
and protection with the demand that their sense of being and right to self-
determination be protected. Finally, it is argued that this model is a necessary 
intermediate step in the move toward a post-gender world.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Gender variance is still widely misunderstood in society today. This misunderstanding 
manifests in a myriad of ways: trans* folk are often subjected to violence, hostility 
and confusion in their everyday lives. This can come in the obvious forms of physical 
violence or threats. For example, leading LGBTQ charity stonewall has found that 
almost 1 in 10 young trans* people have received death threats at school.1 Less 
obvious forms of violence such as misgendering are also damaging and should not be 
underestimated.2 Moreover, not only do trans* folk face threats and violence from 
others, a lack of understanding and acceptance in society often leads to internalized 
transphobia in trans* individuals, leaving many feeling depressed, anxious and 
suicidal. In 2013, trans* people under 26 were found to be nearly twice as likely (48%) 
to have attempted suicide in their life compared to non-transgender people of the same 
age group (26%).3 Moreover, trans* young people were nearly three times more likely 
                                                
1 Stonewall UK, ‘Stonewall School Report 2017: Anti-LGBT bullying down but 
LGBT young people still at risk’, 2017 
<http://www.stonewall.org.uk/news/stonewall-school-report-2017-anti-lgbt-
bullying-down-lgbt-young-people-still-risk>  [accessed 9 January 2018]. 
2	S.D	Finch,	10	things	you’re	actually	saying	when	you	ignore	someone’s	pronouns,	
(2014)	<	https://everydayfeminism.com/2014/10/ignore-gender-pronouns/	>	
[accessed	9	January	2018].	
3	C.	Dinenage,	Gender	Recognition	Act	review	announced	in	plan	for	transgender	
equality,		
2016	<	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/gender-recognition-act-review-
announced-in-plan-for-transgender-equality	>	[accessed	9	January	
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to have self-harmed in the 12 months prior to the study (59%) than non-transgender 
people of the same age (22%).4 
 
A small improvement in recent years is that trans* deaths and suicides appear to be 
more reported in the news, as are more general trans* issues. There is, generally, more 
visibility of trans* lives in mainstream society. Publicity in the media of trans* 
identities is on the rise which brings with it greater attention from the general public. 
There has been a proliferation of documentaries, newspaper articles and online blogs 
around trans* identities and issues and in 2014 Time magazine announced that we 
have now reached a ‘Transgender Tipping Point.’5 
 
However, despite trans* identities becoming generally more visible, this visibility has 
not always created acceptance and understanding. What often happens is that in 
mainstream society trans* lives are depicted in a simplified and monolithic way. 
Trans* identities are often portrayed through reiteration of phrases such as ‘born in 
the wrong body’6 and ‘always felt this way’.7 This language often goes alongside 
depictions of trans* lives as ones filled with struggle, anxiety, self-hate, discomfort 
and dysfunctional mental health. While these narratives can certainly resonate within 
the community, they are by no means the only narrative. Yet, this is all we seem to 
                                                
4	ibid	
5	K.	Steinmetz,	The	Transgender	Tipping	Point,	Times	Magazine	(1	September	2014)	
<http://time.com/135480/transgender-tipping-point/>	[accessed	9	January	2018]	
6	BBC	News,	Transgender	Teens	Born	in	the	Wrong	Body,	BBC	NEWS	(	8	October	
2016)		<	<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-37588612>	[accessed	9	
January	2018]	
7	K.	Lyons,	‘Transgender	stories:	“People	think	we	wake	up	and	decide	to	be	trans”’	
(10	July	2016)	The	Guardian.	
www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jul/10/transgender-stories-people-think-we-
wake-up-and-decide-to-be-trans	[accessed	16	September	2018]	
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hear about trans* lives. The effect of these accounts is that they reduce the variation 
and richness of trans* lives, pathologies them, and hinder those individuals who are 
questioning or curious towards their gender to approach and seek out support from 
the trans* community.  
 
Trans* Lives and Law 
It is apparent then that there is much to be done to make trans* lives more liveable. 
This thesis takes the position that law is an important resource in achieving this 
change. The thesis connects with the long history of efforts within critical legal studies 
to challenge and reform the law as a way of challenging power structures and 
overcoming societies biases and prejudices against marginalized groups. Critical 
theory can and has been used to address and reverses conditions of domination and 
exploitation.8 The power of law in realising emancipatory goals for minorities has also 
been questioned and challenged by Carol Smart in her ground-breaking book 
Feminism and the Power of Law.9 Smart warns against the ‘malevolence’ of law when 
using it, she also points out that legal norms nevertheless play a powerful part in 
asserting how things are by ‘imposing their definition of events on everyday life’.10  
The reason law is able to do this is, in part, because law represents ‘a claim to a 
superior and official field of knowledge.’11  With law claiming this spot, alternative 
and competing versions of life are deemed insignificant or, as Smart puts it, ‘suspect 
                                                
8	Christodoulidis	et	al,	Jurisprudence:	themes	and	concepts	(Routledge	2018)	p.193	
–	p.203.		
9	C.	Smart,	Feminism	and	the	Power	of	Law.	(Routledge,	London	1989)	Dean	Spade	
has	also	questioned	the	usefulness	of	law	in	D.	Spade.,	Normal	Life:	Administrative	
Violence,	Critical	Trans	Politics,	and	the	Limits	of	Law	(Duke	University	Press	2015).		
10	C.	Smart,	Feminism	and	the	Power	of	Law,	1989	at	4.	
11	ibid	
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and/or secondary’.12 In relation to gender recognition, law uses its power and 
influence to regulate and constitute certain gendered lives and ignore those alternative 
versions of what it means to be trans* that live outside its strict and uncompromising 
definitions.13 It will be shown that the Gender Recognition Act, legislation that allows 
for trans* people to be recognised in their acquired gender, classifies and regulates 
trans* lives. Through its mechanisms, procedures and requirements, the GRA 
determines who is a valid an authentic trans* person and therefore worthy of 
recognition. 
 
The GRA performs three broad functions: it offers material legal benefits to trans* 
people; it carries out a symbolic and expressive role and it builds identity and 
increases self-esteem within trans* individuals. It is helpful to say a few words about 
each of these functions. Firstly, there are important material effects of the granting of 
legal recognition: successful applicants may register a change of gender which can 
then be used for all purposes including ID documentation, sex-segregation, and 
                                                
12	ibid	at	11	
13	The	national	LGBT	Survey,	published	in	2018,	had	over	108,000	respondents.	Of	
the	total	sample,	7%	identified	as	non-binary.	Amongst	trans*	respondents,	over	
half	(52%)	identified	as	non-binary.	Government	Equalities	Office,	National	LGBT	
Survey:	Research	Report	,	(July	2018),	16	<	
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/721704/LGBT-survey-research-report.pdf>	[accessed	12	
September	2018].	
A	2016	survey	asking	for	people’s	experiences	of	being	non-binary	attracted	895	
responses	from	self-identified	non-binary	people.	In	this	survey,	over	half	(54%)	
described	their	gender	as	fluid.	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	
UK.	(2016),	13	<	https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Report-final.pdf>	[accessed	12	September	2018].	In	a	
recent	survey	by	Stonewall	UK,	just	under	half	(48%)	of	respondents	describe	their	
gender	in	a	different	way	from	male	or	female.	See	C.L	Bachmann	&	B.	Gooch.	
LGBT	in	Britain:	Trans	Report	(2018),	23	<	
https://www.stonewall.org.uk/sites/default/files/lgbt-in-britain-trans.pdf>		
[accessed	12	September	2018]	
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marriage.14 This not only upholds trans* people’s privacy and dignity but also 
functions to ensure that their insurance policies, marriages and civil partnerships 
pensions are all administered correctly. 
 
Whilst the material advantages of gaining access to the GRA are important, trans 
people can also do a number of things without gaining access to the legislation. In the 
UK one can already change one’s name, access the appropriate NHS services, and 
receive a passport with the appropriate gender/sex marker without having gained 
access to the Act. Yet, although access to the GRA may appear to have little 
substantive effect on what a trans* person can and cannot do in their lives, this should 
not blind us to the crucial expressive role that recognition law plays:  
 
‘There can be no doubt that law, like action in general, has an expressive 
function. Some people do what they do mostly because of the statement the act makes; 
the same is true for those who seek changes in law. Many debates over the appropriate 
content of law are really debates over the statement that law makes, independent of 
its (direct) consequences.’15 
 
What this means is that while it may well be true that attainment of a GRC will not 
create much substantive legal effect beyond that already achieved without one, the 
real importance of the recognition law lies in its symbolic effect. The GRA gives out 
a signal to society that trans* people’s identities are to be respected and validated. A 
                                                
14	The	Gender	Recognition	Act	2004,	section	9	(1)	
	
15	C.R.	Sunstein,	‘On	the	Expressive	Function	of	Law’	(1996)	144	U.Penn.	L.R.	2021,	
2026	
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similar point was made in the Scottish Parliamentary debates over the introduction of 
same-sex marriage when opponents argued that same-sex couples already receive the 
same materials benefits as heterosexual couples under the Civil Partnership Act. 16 
 
Finally, the effect of legal recognition is not only material and expressive, but also 
psychological. Having an authoritative institution such as law deem an identity valid 
goes some way towards enhancing self-esteem and solidifying the new gender 
identification. For example, a recent report on transgender people has shown that lack 
of recognition adversely affects mental health: 
 
‘Being forced to live as someone you’re not, in a society that doesn’t accept 
you, can cause mental health issues…’17 
 
Moreover, a recent report on non-binary identities has suggested that trans* people 
believe that because their non-binary identity has no legal recognition, they are 
                                                
16	See	Stage	One	debate,	‘Official	Report’	(20	November	2013)	speeches	by	Jackie	
Baillie	MSP,	at	col.	24640,	Ruth	Davidson	MSP,	at	col.	24646,	Jim	Hume	MSP,	at	col.	
24658,	and	Alex	Neil,	MSP,	at	col.24694.	accessed	online	<	
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=9521&mode=p
df>	[accessed	18	September	2018].	See	also	Alex	Neil,	MSP	at	Stage	Three	Debate:	
‘This	legislation	sends	a	powerful	message	to	the	world	about	the	kind	of	society	
that	we	in	Scotland	are	trying	to	create’	in	‘Official	Report’	(4	February	2014)	at	
col.27343.	accessed	online	at	<	
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=9329&mode=p
df>	.Cited	in	K.	Norrie,	‘Now	the	dust	has	settled:	The	Marriage	and	Civil	
Partnership	(Scotland)	Act	2014’	(2014)	Juridical	Review	2014	(2)	pp.135-163	at	
note	38.		
17	C.L	Bachmann	&	B.	Gooch.	LGBT	in	Britain:	Trans	Report	(2018),	20	<	
https://www.stonewall.org.uk/sites/default/files/lgbt-in-britain-trans.pdf>		
[accessed	12	September	2018]	
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refused services. In addition, they also believe that lack of visibility and inclusion in 
those services has adverse impacts on their mental health and self-esteem.18  
 
The power and influence of law over gendered bodies therefore cannot be overstated. 
Law plays both a regulatory and constitutive role in gendered lives. In other words, 
law creates and limits the type and amount of liveable lives possible through 
regulations, requirements and mechanisms. Of course, other structures and 
institutions play a large part in dictating gender norms. Yet there is no doubt that law 
compels trans* citizens - viz. its power to form and impose its conceptions of things 
- to cisheteronormative ideals of gender in a massive way. Therefore, whilst I agree 
with the contention that non-legal routes must also be explored in political projects, 
this thesis takes the view that if we are to change the difficulties that trans* people 
face in their day to day life for the better, law is a crucial resource.  
 
Jurisdiction  
Law asserts its power over gendered lives in a way to ensure that trans* lives are 
regulated and produced in a narrow and uncompromising manner. Currently, there are 
two main sources of legislation that concern trans* people in Scotland; the Equality 
Act 2010 and the Gender Recognition Act 2004. Whilst it is the GRA that will form 
the focus of this thesis, discussion will also be given to the Equality Act and its 
predecessors.  There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the development of 
discrimination law plays a crucial role in understanding how trans* people have been 
understood in law. Secondly, consideration must be given to whether the changes to 
                                                
18	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	UK.	(2016),	9	<	
https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Report-final.pdf>	
[accessed	12	September	2018].	
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the GRA proposed in this thesis will affect the rights and protections trans* people 
gain in other areas of law. The GRA is UK wide legislation but gender recognition 
policy is a devolved matter. This means that the changes to the GRA proposed here 
can be made without Westminster’s consent but the Scottish Government will need to 
discuss with Westminster if a Scottish GRC will be recognised in England and Wales. 
Additionally, the proposed changes made to the GRA do not necessarily require any 
amendments to the Equality Act. However, possible amendments to the Equality Act, 
for reasons of clarity, will also be discussed.19 The Equality Act is largely reserved so 
these changes will need to be discussed with Westminster.  
 
Current role of the Gender Recognition Act  
Legal regimes for gender recognition are underpinned by a range of different 
objectives. It is submitted that in Scotland, the current legal regime is seeking to 
regulate and produce trans* lives in a narrow and uncompromising way. The rationale 
for this, it will be discussed, is law’s historical need to uphold the gender binary as 
natural and necessary. This is clear from early recognition and discrimination cases 
and continues despite the introduction of the GRA. It will be shown that the GRA - 
which obliges subjects to repeatedly perform either male or female gender across 
various procedures and activities - constitutes a significant role in sustaining and 
entrenching gender as a binary, dimorphic and biological fact. It is submitted that and 
in light of the struggles of trans* people trying to navigate a world in which their 
gender is constantly put in doubt or challenged and in light of queer developments in 
the concept of what gender is - discussed in chapter two - the rationale behind gender 
recognition law must change. Currently, too much respect is given to upholding the 
                                                
19	See	Chapter	three		
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gender binary in law. More respect must be given to the freedom and autonomy of 
trans* people. This – it will be shown - can be achieved by amending the current 
regime so that law allows people to identify in the way that they wish. Finally, law is 
currently used by trans* people to gain protection from discrimination through the 
Equality Act and also to gain access to trans* specific healthcare. It will be argued 
that the reform proposals to the GRA in this thesis ought not to affect these two 
important functions of law.  
 
 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter one explains and analyses how the law functions to regulate and produce 
trans* lives. I will focus on the norms and discourse in relation to the concepts of sex 
and gender that work to constitute the identities that are recognizable. Accordingly, 
an analysis of cases involving trans* individuals is necessary in order to reveal the 
assumptions about identity that are embedded within their rulings. What is clear from 
the cases prior to the introduction of the GRA is that legal judgements have been 
underpinned by the separation of sex and gender and the construction of biological 
sex. After discussing the preceding case law prior to its introduction, the focus will 
then be the Gender Recognition Act 2004. I will demonstrate that whilst the GRA is 
an improvement to the law in some respects, it is not without its problems. On the one 
hand, the GRA is to be welcomed for its apparent lack of surgery requirement as a 
precondition to legal recognition, signaling a shift from the concept of sex to the 
concept of gender in law’s understanding of the distinction between male and 
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female.20 The result of this is that trans* persons who cannot or choose not to alter 
their body now have access to recognition. However, there are problems in the Act. 
The act is based on a notion of identity that makes the trans community pathological, 
it excludes trans* lives and ensures they are kept at the margins. It achieves this 
through: requiring a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, demanding the applicant live in 
their acquired gender for at least two years, enforcing a gender permanence 
mechanism and by denying recognition to trans* lives that live outside the binary. 
Trans* lives who are unable or do not wish to identify in a way that is congruent with 
the restrictive and uncompromising narrative that the act requires are excluded.  
Meanwhile, those that are able to satisfy the requirements of the Act are included, but 
in a way that figures them as mentally ill. Trans* lives are, therefore, not given 
freedom and autonomy over their gendered lives. For many, the limited choice is to 
live without recognition and the difficulties that come with this, or to otherwise force 
oneself into a category and a process that one does not align with. Moreover, this form 
of recognition does little to change the marginal status of trans* individuals as it posits 
them as the unnatural exceptions to the natural male/female binary. As Sandland 
argues, ‘there is (intentionally) little that is new about the GRA’ in regards to the 
theoretical underpinnings of it.21 The conceptual assumptions behind the Act ensure 
that trans* lives are kept at the margins. The expressive power of law is (yet again) 
                                                
20	S.	Cowan,	‘“Gender	is	no	substitute	for	sex”:	A	comparative	human	rights	
analysis	of	the		
legal	regulation	of	sexual	identity.”	(2005);	Feminist	Legal	Studies	13:67-96;	R	
Sandland,	‘Feminism	and	the	Gender	Recognition	Act	2004’	(2005)	Feminist	Legal	
Studies		
13(1):43-66 	
21	R.	Sandland,	Running	to	Stand	Still’	(2009)	Social	&	Legal	Studies	18:2,	pp.	253	–	
257,	p.253.	
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being used to send the message to society that trans* people are less than those who 
identify as cis.  
 
It will be argued that these problems stem from a particular construction of trans* 
lives that underpins legal thinking. This particular construction of transsexuality is 
one which is based on the idea of an authentic trans* identity; an identity which acts 
to uphold both the sex/gender binary and a temporal framework of ‘straight’ time. 
Chapter two sets out to refigure trans* embodiment with the view that it can make 
way for a new fluid and nuanced model of recognition. Chapter two looks closely at 
the idea of ‘becoming’, which complicates both the sex/gender binary and our 
common understanding of how time operates. ‘Becoming’ provides fertile ground to 
re-imagine trans* identity. It allows us to reimagine trans* bodies as open-ended 
systems and existences that are subject to the active forces of culture, nature and time. 
Trans* embodiments are unpredictable and fluid and do not develop in a linear and 
stable manner. These insights, when incorporated into trans* recognition law, allow 
us to drop the two ideas that there is a specific thing that is knowable to experts or to 
ourselves in which being a woman, or a man, or trans* exists, and that there must be 
some concrete shared content to that assertion. It therefore allows us to critique and 
discard a recognition model that is still routed through the question of what constitutes 
an authentic trans* identity.  
 
Chapter two refigures trans* subjectivity with the view that it will allow for a nuanced 
and fluid model of recognition that could deal with the problems inherent in the GRA. 
The exact contours of this new model will be explored in Chapter three. The value of 
this model is that it will ‘disconnect the claim to 'authenticity' of identity from the 
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demand for recognition’22 and will therefore go some way towards remedying the 
feelings of ‘not being trans* enough’ that are experienced by many individuals.23 
Moreover, this model will better balance trans* folks demand for recognition with the 
need to retain their specificity and respect their freedom and autonomy.  The model 
will involve both a self-identification and a multiple gender schema. Crucially, it is 
submitted that a model such as this – in which law steps back from assigning gender 
- need not affect the rights and protection that come with gendered laws. Gender, as a 
category, is currently relied upon for protection against discrimination and to allow 
access to healthcare. A particular concern that has been raised around changing the 
GRA is that de-regulating gender would mean that these rights and protections 
disappear. However, de-centring the law does not necessarily mean that the law 
cannot continue to regulate gendereddecisions, nor does it mean that trans* healthcare 
                                                
22	D.	Cornell	&	S.	Murphy,	‘Anti-racism,	multiculturalism	and	the	ethics	of	
identification’	Philosophy	and	Social	Criticism,	4	(2002)	pp.419-449,	p.420	
23 Gendered Intelligence, an online resource for trans* discuss how expectations 
from within and out with the trans* community can make trans people feel like they 
are ‘not trans enough’. See Trans Identities. (2018) 
http://genderedintelligence.co.uk/projects/kip/transidentities [accessed 12 September 
2018]; See also D. Chase & J. Catalano, ‘”Trans Enough?”: The Pressures Trans 
Men Negotiate in Higher Education’ (2015) Transgender Studies Quarterly (2015) 
2:3 pp.411-430; In the survey on non-binary people in the UK, 20% answered 
‘unsure’ and 15% answered ‘no’ to the question “do you consider yourself to be 
trans*?” 9% of this group said they answered this way because they felt that they 
weren’t “trans enough”. V. Valentine. Non-Binary People’s Experiences in the UK. 
(2016), 17 < https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Report-
final.pdf> [accessed 12 September 2018]. A number of trans* writers also described 
feelings of ‘not being trans* enough’ in their writing. See, for example, D. Spade, 
‘Resisting medicine, re/modeling gender.’(2003) Berkley Women’s LJ 18: pp. 15 – 
37 at 22. and SD. Finch, 5 Affirmations for Trans* folks who don’t feel Trans* 
Enough. (2017) < https://everydayfeminism.com/2017/03/trans*-folk-dont-feel-
trans*-enough/ > [accessed 10 January 2018] 
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practices will no longer be covered.24 This will be dealt with in Chapter three. The 
model proposed can better balance the need to grant crucial rights and protection to 
trans* people whilst at the same time giving people space to live the gendered life of 
their own choosing. In addition, it is believed that this scheme will make crucial steps 
towards situating trans* lives alongside cis lives and expressing to the world that both 
are equal.  
 
Methods, sources and positionality 
This	thesis	employs	a	theoretical	approach	to	the	study	of	gender	recognition	law	
and	legal	sources.	It	draws	on	existing	empirical	academic	and	activist	research	on	
gender	recognition	and	identity	and	on	the	experiences	of	the	same	within	the	trans	
community.		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24	For	a	discussion	on	how	the	law	can	continue	to	regulate	gendered	decisions,	see	
D	Cooper	and	F	Renz,	'If	the	State	Decertified	Gender,	What	Might	Happen	to	its	
Meaning	and	Value?	'	[2016]	43(4)	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	484.	For	a	discussion	
on	how	trans*	specific	health	care	need	to	be	tied	to	a	medical	diagnosis,	see	J.	
Butler,	‘Undiagnosing	Gender’	in	Undoing	Gender	(New	York:	Routledge,	2004)	
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CHAPTER ONE 
Trans* Recognition Law 
 
 
 
Introduction 
There are two main sources of law that offer rights and protection to trans* people: 
The Equality Act 2010 and Gender Recognition Act 2004. Under the former, gender 
reassignment is a protected characteristic, meaning that those who possess it are 
protected from discrimination by the legislation. The Act covers people who are 
proposing to undergo, currently undergoing or have undergone a process (or part of a 
process) of gender reassignment.25 This piece of legislation will be discussed further 
below but it is the latter, the GRA, which forms the main focus of this thesis. The 
GRA offers full legal recognition to trans* people in their acquired gender. Whilst the 
Act is to be welcomed in some respects, it has its problems. The way in which law 
recognises transgender lives has been, and still is, problematic. From the induction of 
the biology based Corbett test in 1970 that was used to determine subjects legal sex, 
law has continued to use biological essentialism to conceptualise trans* lives for many 
years.26 Using the biology is destiny logic, law has been able to control and regulate 
trans* subjectivity so that pre-operative transgender people were unable to be 
recognised in their chosen gender. Law was operating on the premise that there was 
an authentic way to be trans* and if one did not satisfy the criteria – which was in the 
earlier cases surgery - no recognition was granted. The introduction of The GRA in 
                                                
25	Section	7	(1)		
26	(Otherwise	Ashley)	[1970]	2	All	E.R.	33	
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2004 moved away from biology and pays particular attention to gender, which has  
had positive legal affects for trans* folk. Surgery is no longer a prerequisite to legal 
recognition and thus pre-operative trans* people now have access to legal recognition. 
This improvement is evidence of the GRA incorporating queer developments in the 
understanding of sex and gender and signals a move away from some of the troubling 
aspects of the Corbett judgment. However, it also demonstrates the continuing power 
of the sex/gender binary and the construction of sex – and the law’s need to uphold it 
- that was evident in the Corbett case. While legal sexual identity may no longer be 
determined purely by biology, sex still lingers as a ‘truth’ – unchangeable and waiting 
to be discovered by scientific fact. In other words, the constructed nature of sex, as 
separate from gender, remains. This is apparent in the provisions of the act: a gender 
dysphoria diagnosis is required, as well as production of gender stability for two years 
prior to recognition and the promise of gender permanence post-recognition. 
Moreover, the Act only allows for the recognition of male and female genders. With 
provisions determining whether a trans* person does in fact, truthfully, have the 
identity they claim, the Act therefore operates through an ‘authentic/inauthentic’ 
trans* framework.  The three features of the Act will each be explored below. First, 
the troubling effects of each will be discussed and the real-life effects they have on 
trans* individuals will be explored before going onto show how they are indicative of 
the construction of sex and gender underpinning the law. My analysis will begin by 
tracing how legal recognition of transgender individuals emerged and the legal 
thinking around concepts of sex and gender that emerged alongside it. This will begin 
with a discussion of the state of the law prior to the GRA, beginning with Corbett, 
before moving onto a discussion of the GRA. The chapter will end with the suggestion 
that a reconceptualization of sex and gender, concepts which underpin the way in 
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which trans* subjectivity is understood in law, is needed in order to remedy the 
problematic elements of the current law highlighted.  
 
Terminology  
I will be using the term ‘trans*’ throughout this thesis. To explain this choice, it is 
important to illustrate what is meant by the words transsexual, transgender and trans*. 
The literature uses them interchangeably and in many (and frequently) contested 
ways. Transsexual is often used to refer to individuals who use hormonal and/or 
surgery technologies to alter their body in ways that may be considered to be at odds 
with their sex assignment of birth or which may not be readily intelligible in terms of 
traditional conceptions of sexed bodies. Transsexuals often self-identify within the 
binary i.e. as either an unambiguous man or as an unambiguous woman. Transgender, 
on the other hand, is a more ambiguous self-identification. It will be used here to refer 
to people who do not appear to conform to traditional gender norms by presenting and 
living genders that were not assigned to them at birth or by presenting and living 
genders in ways that may not be readily intelligible in terms of more traditional 
conceptions.  By which I mean that the gender presentation may be read as misaligned 
with the sexed body, either successfully or not. Transgender folk may not seek surgery 
and/or hormones and may also cross gender in ways which may be less permanent. 
However, transgender is not simply the ‘non-surgical’ option. In fact, transgender is 
both resistance and an alternative to medicine and/or scientific authority over the 
gender identity. Transgender is not simply deciding not to have surgery but can also 
mean deciding not to comply with systemic norms and the procedures around sex and 
gender that they have spurned. As will be explored fully in Chapter three, the contours 
of each category are increasingly acknowledged as blurred. This is why the term 
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trans* is useful. It encapsulates both categories and also acts as a nod to the fact that 
the categories can and do overlap. It is also useful when considering the fact that 
gender terminology is not one word fits all. The label that works for one person may 
not work for another. Finally, trans* with an asterisk is useful for the reason that it 
also signifies the continued push of boundaries regarding the conceptualisation of 
trans* embodiment. This will become clearer in Chapter two, which introduces the 
concept of ‘becoming’, and an expansive approach to embodiment that includes the 
complex intertwinement of biology, culture and also time.   
 
 
The Development of Trans* Law Prior to the GRA 
The concepts of sex and gender and how they relate to each other have an impact on 
the legal regulation of trans* lives.27 The regulation of trans* lives by law not only 
controls and manages trans* people, it also produces trans* people. In other words, 
regulation ‘determines, more or less, what we are, what we can be.’28 The types of 
subjectivity that law deems legible and recognisable are the types of lives that are 
liveable. Therefore, how we conceptualise sex and gender has a massive effect on 
liveable lives. The legal recognition of trans* folk have emerged alongside the 
medical recognition of trans* persons. Not surprising then, legal thinking around the 
concepts of sex and gender have very much been influenced by medical discourse. 
Historically, medical science has taken the view that sexual identity is based on sex 
which is biological and is fixed at birth. Features that are associated with gender, such 
                                                
27	S.	Cowan,	‘“Gender	is	no	substitute	for	sex”:	A	comparative	human	rights	
analysis	of	the		
legal	regulation	of	sexual	identity.”	(2005)	Feminist	Legal	Studies	13	pp.	67-96	
(p.69)	
28	J.	Butler,	Undoing	Gender	(Routledge	2004)	p.57	
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as behaviours, attitudes, lifestyle and felt sense of gender are given little to no weight. 
This medicalised understanding of sexual identity, the construction of sex as 
biological and as distinct from gender, has been applied to conceptualising trans* 
identity. As a result of this, prior to the introduction of the GRA, law has been 
reluctant to provide any means to legally recognise gender identity, insisting instead 
that one remained the sex they were assigned at birth, notwithstanding and steps taken 
to physically or socially change sex. Time and time again, the courts upheld the 
heavily medically influenced test for legal sex as laid down in Corbett. 
 
Corbett 
The first common law decision to consider the sexual identity claims of a trans* 
persons for purposes of marriage was the landmark English decision of Corbett v 
Corbett.29 The influence of the Corbett case on legal thinking concerning legal sex 
cannot be overstated. Despite being a case about marriage, the test for legal sex 
established in it has been subsequently applied broadly and its influence is still evident 
in trans* law today. The case concerned the validity of a marriage between a 
biological man and a post-operative male to female transgender woman. In this 
decision Ormrod J held that sex is determined at birth and by a congruence of 
chromosomal, gonadal and genital factors.30 Since marriage at that time could only be 
between a man and woman, and because under this test April Ashley was a woman, 
the marriage was held to be invalid. In addition to saying that sex is biological and 
fixed at birth, the Corbett case also shows that law considered sex and gender to be 
                                                
29	Corbett	v	Corbett	(Otherwise	Ashley)	[1970]	2	All	E.R.	33	
30	ibid	106[D]. 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distinct, and that gender is to be ignored in determining legal sex. These three 
elements of the case will now be considered in more detail below.  
 
The law in Corbett quite clearly puts sex at the focus of sexual identity, which is to 
be determined by biological factors. In determining how the law should deal with the 
criteria used by medicine when determining sex i.e. chromosomes, gonads, genitals, 
psychology and secondary sex characteristics Ormond J stated that:  
 
‘the law should adopt […] the first three of the doctor’s criteria, i.e., the 
chromosal, gonadal, and genital tests, and if all three are congruent, determine sex for 
the purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative interventions.’31  
 
 
Sex is determined by biology and cannot be changed, notwithstanding any gender 
reassignment surgery that has been carried out. Lord Nicholls describes the gender 
reassignment as medical operations that merely create fake genitals:  
 
‘For men surgery may mean castration or inversion of the penis to create false 
vagina. For women it may mean a mastectomy, hysterectomy or creation of a false 
penis by phalloplasty.’32 
 
The use of the word false indicate that the courts view the surgery as merely 
superficial changes to one’s body and do not in fact signal a ‘true’ change of sex. The 
                                                
31	ibid	
32	ibid,	98	
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function of the operations, is to help the patient psychologically, not to alter their sex. 
As Ormrod states, surgery: 
 
‘is, of course, to help to relieve the patient’s symptoms and to assist in the 
management of their disorder; it is not to change their sex.’33  
 
It is clear that surgery, in the law’s eyes, is carried out not to indicate a real sex change, 
but to fabricate the trans* subjects body as a way of alleviating the suffering that is 
taking place inside the mind. 34  The Corbett case therefore makes it clear that legal 
sex is determined at birth, which is decided by biology, notwithstanding any surgical 
alterations to one’s body. In addition, the Corbett case also indicates that a separation 
of sex from gender existed in legal thinking. The fact that the court decided that legal 
sex was fixed at birth and that surgery is unable to alter one’s ‘true sex’ is indicative 
of the distinction made between ‘natural’ biological sex and social gender.35 Law not 
only ignores any reassignment surgery in its determination of legal sex, it also ignores 
the individuals social and self-identified gender. With sex at the focus, gender is given 
little to no consideration. The fact that Corbett self-identified as a woman and lived 
socially as a woman is deemed irrelevant for the purpose of deciding what legal sex 
she is. Gender is treated as a social factor that is to be trumped by biological sex. As 
Cowan observes, Corbett confirmed that law believes that ‘sex is not a matter of 
choice in law; rather it is an essential biological characteristic.’36 
                                                
33	ibid	
34	K.	Norrie,	‘Is	the	gender	recognition	act	2004	as	important	as	it	seems?’.	In	S.	A.	
M.	McLean	(Ed.),	First	do	no	harm:	law,	ethics	and	health	care.	(Applied	Legal	
Philosophy,	2006)	pp.	561-572	(p.564)	
35	Corbett	v	Corbett	[1971]	at	p.107	
36 S.	Cowan, ‘Gender is no substitute for sex’, 2005, p.74 
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Corbett shows then that one’s legal sex is that sex which was assigned at birth, based 
on the congruence of biological factors and that both self-identified gender and 
attempts to alter ones primary or secondary sex characteristics has no legal impact. 
The effect of this test on transsexuals is that someone who has undergone surgery to 
modify his or her body to make it congruent with his or her gender identity has not 
changed sex and that the gender someone identifies as or lives as socially will be 
trumped by the biological make-up of their body. Under this test many trans* folk 
were left in somewhat of a legal limbo; they were living a life different from the one 
that was being legally recognised. For example, a socially transitioned MtF trans* 
woman could be living a life as a female for all social purpose but is deemed as a male 
in law. This lack of recognition clearly affected all areas of life, evidenced in the 
Corbett case by the fact that April Ashely could not marry the woman she loved in 
her gender. Not only does lack of recognition affect legal areas of folk’s lives, it also 
has the effect of requiring trans* folk to ‘come out’ repeatedly in day to day life. 
Moreover, without the authoritative legal recognition behind the ‘coming out’, it can 
attract responses of doubt, violence, discrimination and also cause feelings of anxiety, 
distress and embarrassment. 
 
Bellinger 
Corbett was upheld for a number of years following the ruling and the criteria within 
it was used as the test for determining a person’s legal sex. In terms of UK domestic 
law, perhaps the most significant recent case after Corbett and prior to the GRA was 
Bellinger v. Bellinger.37 The case involved a post-operative male to female 
                                                
37	Bellinger	v	Bellinger	[2001]	EWCA	Civ	1140;	[2002]	Fam	150		
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transsexual who sought a declaration that her marriage to her husband was valid under 
the Family Law Act. The case went to court of appeal and then, later, also the House 
of Lords. In the Court of Appeal judgement, the judges, following Corbett, held that 
the marriage was invalid.38  Yet, although Corbett was upheld, the case features hints 
that change to the way in which legal sex is to be determined in law was to come. 
Firstly, the reason for following Corbett was not due to the soundness of the reasoning 
in it but rather due to the reasoning that to depart from Corbett would involve a 
significant change to the law which, it was held, is not for the courts to make but for 
parliament.39 Secondly, there was a strong dissent from Thorpe LJ. Thorpe LJ stated 
that the aetiology of transsexualism is not known but the test established in Corbett 
which stated that three biological features should trump the psychological component 
may no longer be relevant in current times.40 Accordingly, the cause of transsexuality 
may now include biological, physiological and psychological factors: 
  
 ‘in my opinion the test that is confined to physiological factors, whilst 
attractive for its simplicity and apparent certainty of outcome, is manifestly 
incomplete. There is no logic or principle in excluding one vital component of 
personality, the psyche. That its admission imports the difficulties of application that 
may lead to less certainty of outcome is an inevitable consequence. But we should 
prefer complexity to superficiality in that the psychological self is the product of an 
extremely complex process, although not fully understood.’41 
 
                                                
38	Bellinger	v.	Bellinger	[2002]	Fam.	150,	160	
39	ibid,	177	
40	ibid,	113	
41	ibid	at	132	
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Although he was not in the majority, Thorpe LJ’s dissent is significant for the reason 
that one of his main points - the importance of psychological factors in determining 
legal status - was subsequently crucial in the ECHR case of Goodwin v UK one year 
later.   
 
 
Goodwin 
Prior to the case of Goodwin, the ECHR granted member states a reasonably wide 
margin of appreciation in refusing trans* person’s claims to recognition. 42 Goodwin 
however, changed this. In Goodwin, the applicant, an MtF postoperative trans* 
woman, submitted that the failure of the UK to recognise her as a female for the 
purposes of social security, pensions and retirement age was a breach of Art 8, Art 12, 
Art 13 and Art 14 of the ECHR.43 The ECHR held that there was a violation of Art 8 
and 12. For our purposes, two important developments happened in Goodwin which 
signal a change in legal thinking around the concept of sex and gender that were 
evident in Corbett. Firstly, the judges rejected a biological essentialist test that was 
established in Corbett: 
 
 ‘[t]he Court is not persuaded therefore that the state of medical science or 
scientific knowledge provides any determining argument as regards the legal 
recognition of transsexuals.’44  
                                                
42	see	Rees	v	UK	[1986]	9	EHRR	56;	Cossey	v	UK	[1991]	13	EHRR	622;	X,	Y	and	Z	v	UK	
[1997]	EHRR	143;	Sheffield	and	Horsham	v	UK	[1998]	2	FLR	928)		
43	Respectively,	these	articles	covered	the	right	to	respect	for	private	and	family	
life;	the	right	to	marry;	the	right	to	an	effective	remedy	and	prohibition	of	
discrimination.	
44	Goodwin	v	United	Kingdom	(2002)	35	EHRR	18,	83	
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The judges acknowledged that the Corbett test for sex (congruence of genetic and 
physiological traits) is no longer appropriate. In addition to this, gender and 
social/psychological traits must also be considered in determining sexual identity.  
The court’s reasoning in Goodwin indicated a move away from the test established by 
Ormrod J in Corbett which relied solely on physiological criteria over psychological 
identity. In other words, gender was no longer being ignored. It must be noted at this 
point that non-surgery recognition remained to be unrecognised, as Goodwin was a 
post-operative trans* person. However, the readiness of the ECHR to move away from 
medical and scientific findings as determinative of the legal sex of trans* persons in 
law hinted that it pre-operative recognition could, in future, become a legal reality.  
As Rudolf put it, the case ‘abandoned the view that medical knowledge about the 
causes of transsexualism was a determining factor.’45 In other words, although 
Goodwin was a limited judgement in that it only referred to postoperative 
transsexuals, it was transformative in that it suggested that recognition law need not 
be reliant on the authenticity of sex, based on biological factors with little to no 
consideration of gender: 
  
‘[w]hile it [...] remains the case that a transsexual cannot acquire all the 
biological characteristics of the assigned sex, the Court notes that with increasingly 
sophisticated surgery and types of hormonal treatments, the principal unchanging 
biological aspect of gender identity is the chromosomal element. [...] It is not apparent 
                                                
45 B. Rudolf, ‘European Court of Human Rights: Legal Status of Postoperative 
Transsexuals’ (2003) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1(4): pp.716-756 
(721). 
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to the Court that the chromosomal element, amongst all the others, must inevitably 
take on decisive significance for the purposes of legal attribution of gender identity 
for transsexuals.’46 
 
The approach taken by the ECHR in Goodwin indicated a fundamental shift in the 
thinking around gender and sex. Significantly, Goodwin did not directly change 
domestic gender recognition law. What it did do, however, is lead the House of Lords 
in Bellinger to declare that domestic marriage law in the UK is incompatible with the 
ECHR.  
 
 
Bellinger in the House Of Lords 
The Bellinger case came before the House of Lords nine months after Goodwin.47 The 
HOL in this case were faced with the decision of either departing from Corbett and 
applying Goodwin or applying Goodwin narrowly and upholding Corbett. The judges 
chose to uphold Corbett as accurately representing the law of England but declared 
that the law was incompatible with European Human Right law. The reason for 
choosing to apply Corbett was not due to the soundness of the biological test 
established in it, but for the reason that to do so would require a major change to the 
law.48 Like the judgement of the Court of Appeal case, the court again stated that this 
was a job  for the legislature, not the court to make.49 This decision has been criticized 
by Norrie for its failure to follow a modern approach that was being applied in other 
                                                
46	ibid	at	82. 	
47	Bellinger	v	Bellinger	[2003]	2	AC	at	467,	467	
48	ibid	
49	ibid		
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jurisdictions in favour of applying Corbett.50 Despite the questioning of the suitability 
of the Corbett test, the judges in the HOL nevertheless ‘deliberately chose to reject 
the modern approach of the Australian High Court and to follow the earlier English 
case.’51 As recently as Bellinger, then, law has demonstrated that is believes legal sex 
is based on essential and fixed categories and can to be determined by recourse to 
scientific truth: 
 
‘[i]ndividuals cannot choose for themselves whether they wish to be known or 
treated as male or female. Self-definition is not acceptable. That would make nonsense 
of the underlying biological basis of the distinction.’52  
 
The long-lasting influence of Corbett therefore cannot be overstated.  Following 
Bellinger, Corbett still ruled. The courts have applied Corbett time and time again 
despite many opportunities to depart. The effect of this is that pre-operative trans* 
people, following Bellinger, were unable to gain legal recognition in their chosen 
gender.  
 
Discrimination Law Protections 
The position of pre-op trans* people was similarly precarious at this time in regard to 
gaining protection from discrimination. Prior to the introduction of the Equality Act 
2010 (the legislation that now governs discrimination is Scotland and the rest of the 
UK) the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 covered this area of law. However, the 
                                                
50	K.	Norrie,	‘Bellinger	v	Bellinger:	The	House	of	Lords	and	the	Gender	Recognition	
bill.’	(2004)	Edinburgh	Law	Review,	pp.	93-99	
51	ibid	at	p.94	
52	Bellinger	v	Bellinger	[2003]	UKHL	21	at	477	
	 34	
introduction of this Act in 1975 did not mean that trans people were protected from 
discrimination; it did not contain any provision for the protection of those who were 
in the process of gender reassignment. The protection under the SDA was only 
available to heterosexuals who were able to compare their treatment to someone of 
the opposite sex. 53  Protection for trans* people against discrimination came only in 
1996 with the landmark ECJ ruling of P v S, which held that gender discrimination on 
grounds of gender reassignment is unlawful.54 Following this case, in 1999 secondary 
legislation was introduced to the SDA which made it unlawful to discriminate on 
grounds of gender reassignment in employment.55 Things moved further still in 2008 
when secondary legislation was again introduced which extended this protection to 
goods and services.56 The legal meaning of ‘gender reassignment’ under these 
provisions included explicit reference to being under ‘medical supervision’ as part of 
transition.57 This meant it was not clear that a trans* person who was pre-operative 
would gain protection under the legislation. The case of Croft illuminated this. In 
Croft, it was initially held by the EAT that an employee who was assigned male at 
birth but had begun to transition socially was a man. Therefore, the court held, there 
was no discrimination in his employers preventing use of a female toilet. 58  Bellinger 
was relied upon to determine that Croft was legally male despite feminization steps 
                                                
53	Sex	Discrimination	Act	1975,	section	1	
54	P	v.	S	and	Cornwall	County	Council,	Case	C-13/94,	[1996]	IRLR	347		
55	The	Sex	Discrimination	(Gender	Reassignment)	Regulations	1999	(SI	1999/1102)	
amending	the	SDA	1975	to	specifically	include	discrimination	on	the	grounds	of	
gender	reassignment.		,	in	so	far	as	the	applicant	“intends	to	undergo,	is	
undergoing	or	has	undergone	gender	reassignment”	(s.2A(1)	of	the	SDA	1975).		
56	Sex	Discrimination	Act	1975	(Amendment)	Regulations	2008,	SI	2008/656,	regs	
.2(2)	and	2(3).	
57	See	Sex	Discrimination	(Gender	Reassignment)	Regulations	1999,	SI	1999/1102	
and	Sex	Discrimination	Act	1975	(Amendment)	Regulations	2008,	SI	2008/656,	regs	
.2(2)	and	2(3).	
58	Croft	v	Royal	Mail	[2002]	I.R.L.R.	851	
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and social changes she had taken as part of her transition.59 Goodwin was considered 
but the court ultimately ruled that it was of no use in the present case as Goodwin was 
a post-operative trans* case whereas Croft was pre-operative.60 The Court of Appeal 
took a more subtle approach and held that gender reassignment protection covered all 
stages of the reassignment under medical supervision but that it was correct to prohibit 
use of the female toilet for a period of time during which Ms Croft could use the 
unisex (disabled) toilet.61 In other words, trans* people who were under transition 
were not immediately entitled to be treated as members of the sex to which they 
aspired. A pre-operative trans* woman could be considered a woman for legal 
purposes, but it is very much dependent on the circumstances to determine the point 
at which a male to female transsexual becomes a woman, and is therefore entitled to 
use the same facilities as other women. Croft therefore showed a significant limitation 
of both discrimination law and Goodwin: pre-operative trans* people do not 
automatically get the rights and protections of the gender they self-identify as. 
Although the case of Goodwin was progressive, the cases of Croft and Bellinger 
refused to apply it broadly. The positon of pre-operative trans* people remained to be 
precarious under both areas of gender recognition law and discrimination law at this 
time. 
 
The GRA however, with its elimination of the surgery requirement, changes this.62 
Pre-operative trans* people can now be recognised in law. However, as will be 
                                                
59	Croft	at	para.66.	
60	Croft	at	para.72.	
61	Croft	v	Royal	Mail	[2003]	IRLR	592.	
62		The		
	2010	also	improved	the	situation	of	pre-op	trans*	people.	Equality	Act	2010	mainly	
consolidated	the	previous	provisions	under	the	Sex	Discrimination	Act	1975,	but	it	
amended	the	definition	of	gender	reassignment	by	removing	the	need	for	medical	
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explored below, the staying power of the construction of sex as distinct from gender 
and the law’s concern in upholding the gender binary is also evident in the 
introduction of the Gender Recognition Act. 
 
The Gender Recognition Act 
Three months after the House of Lords decision in Bellinger and on the one-year 
anniversary of the European Court’s decision in Goodwin, a draft bill intended to 
overwrite the rule in Corbett and Bellinger was published. In April 2005 the GRA 
2004 came into force.  The GRA introduces a regulatory scheme which allows for the 
recognition by law of a trans* person in an acquired gender identity. The Act can be 
seen as a response to the requirements of Goodwin and is also the result of a long 
campaign by the trans* community, in particular the trans* pressure group Press for 
Change, for legal recognition. Section 9 (1) provides that, on recognition, 
 
‘the person’s gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender (so that, if 
the acquired gender is the male gender the person’s sex becomes that of a man and, if 
it is the female gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a woman).’63 
 
The requirements for a successful standard track application under section 2 of the 
GRA are that the applicant: (1) is over 18 years of age and has, or has had, a diagnosis 
                                                
supervision.	The	Equality	Act	could	be	clearer:	although	it	does	not	refer	to	
medically	supervised,	it	does	refer	to	‘gender	reassignment’	and	‘transsexual’.	
These	are	outdated	and	confusing	terms	and	work	to	suggest	that	only	post-op	
trans*	people	will	be	covered.	The	explanatory	notes	to	the	Act,	however,	confirm	
that	pre-op	are	covered.	See	Equality	Act	2010:	Explanatory	Notes,	August	2010,	
para	41-43.	Accessed	at	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/division/3/2/1/4	[accessed	
16	September	2018].			
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of gender dysphoria;64 (2) has lived in their acquired gender for two years;65 and (3) 
intends to continue to live in their acquired gender ‘until death’.66  It is these three 
requirements in the GRA, that of gender dysphoria, the two year provision and the 
gender permanence provision that are the focus of the second part of my analysis of 
the GRA, as well as  the fact that only men and women are recognized. All four of 
these features of the Act will be explored. This exploration will involve both an 
analysis of the real life effects of the requirements and also how these requirements 
are indicative of the conceptions of sex and gender that underpin the Act. It will 
become clear that whilst the Act demonstrates significant changes in legal thinking in 
relation to sex and gender, the legacy of Corbett – that is, the distinction of sex and 
gender that underpinned the case and the biological understanding of legal sex – 
remains. 
 
No Surgery Requirement  
As noted above, the Act is a response to the requirements laid down by Goodwin. 
Importantly, however, this response is not merely an implementation of Goodwin but 
in fact goes beyond. Recall that Goodwin did not require that the UK government 
change legal recognition law so that surgery was no longer required. Rather, Goodwin 
left the option open. As discussed, the case of Croft chose to interpret Goodwin 
narrowly and this could have well been the route that the UK took by choosing to only 
provide for post-operative recognition.  The GRA did not follow this path however 
and instead goes further than what was strictly required by the European Court. The 
GRA does not require individuals to undergo any form of body modification prior to 
                                                
64	ibid	s.2(1)(a)	
65	ibid	s.2(1)(b)	
66	ibid	s.2(1)(c)	
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being able to access the protections in the legislation. This feature of the Act is to be 
applauded on a number of grounds. Firstly, the lack of surgery requirement better 
captures the reality of trans* lives. Equating trans* with genital reassignment does not 
in fact reflect the reality of many trans* lives. As noted above, law should make space 
for trans* person’s autonomy and freedom over their gendered lives and reflect the 
most possible lives. It will do so by representing the lived experience people actually 
inhabit. The issue with surgery is that firstly, and most simply, many people are 
medical-phobes and do not want intrusive operations carried out on their body. 
Halberstam, for example (talking about hormones): 
 
‘I watch friends, one after the other, transition, mostly from butch to TG male 
and I wonder whether I am just sitting on a fence and not wanting to jump. But 
actually, as a real medi-phobe, I don’t see taking hormones, even in small doses as 
right for me for any extended amount of time.’67 
 
Medical procedures are serious and often frightening life events. Like many other 
medical procedures, the patient will weigh up the pros and cons before they make a 
decision to receive it or not. Trans* folk’s aversion or willingness to such procedures 
will play a part. Secondly, a surgical requirement is ignorant to intersectionality 
concerns. Trans* people of colour and trans* folk who are poor experience the world 
differently to that of white middle class trans* people. It is therefore not enough to 
focus on trans* recognition across gender differences: race and class must likewise be 
                                                
67	J.	Halberstam,	On	Pronouns,	2012	http://www.jackhalberstam.com/on-
pronouns/	[accessed	9	January	2018]	
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considered.68 Poor and coloured trans* people often cannot or do not wish to have 
surgery, largely due to financial reasons. Many trans* individuals simply cannot 
afford the surgery. Many of the technologies of bodily reconstruction are expensive 
and, when not covered by a health care system, are not financially viable options for 
most trans* people. The NHS in the UK provides surgery for no cost but there are 
reports that its availability is not consistent across the country. According to Cowan, 
for example: 
 
 ‘Although surgery is available on the NHS in the UK, it seems that its 
availability is not consistent across the country; according to Press for Change, many 
transsexual people are denied surgery because their Primary Healthcare Trust has 
insufficient funds to support surgical reassignment as a priority treatment.’69 
 
Also consider, for example, the fact that in many trans* subcultures sex work is a 
dominant practice and source of income for poor trans* women, particularly trans* 
women of colour. For these women, as Bettcher points out, genital reconstruction 
surgery ‘will not necessarily be a desired goal, since this may well cause the loss of a 
crucial source of income.’70 The practical focus on surgery obscures the ways in which 
poor and racialized trans* people view surgery, as compared to white middle class 
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people. Finally, financially viable or not, the ‘search for harmony does not require 
surgical intervention’ for many trans* individuals.71 Stonewall UK recently reported 
that one in ten trans* people do not want any form of medical intervention.72 Recall 
from the terminology section that the term trans* is now understood to encompass 
both those who wish to have surgical intervention and those who do not.  A surgical 
requirement only reflects the reality of transsexual individuals, those who do want 
surgery, and ignores transgender individuals, those who may not seek it. Many trans* 
individuals experience of being trans* does not include a transformative process with 
regard to their physical body. Not all trans* people feel the need to resort to surgery 
in order to feel that they inhabit the correctly gendered body. Many are quite happy 
with their bodies. A positive effect of the GRA then is that recognition is now given 
to persons with functioning male sexual organs as female and persons with 
functioning female sexual organs as male. Law is now giving recognition to the reality 
that individuals are actually inhabiting. Having a surgery requirement would ignore 
the lives of trans* individuals, broadly defined. The lack of it is a welcomed feature 
of the GRA and goes some way in achieving what should be the function of law when 
it comes to gender recognition; that is, to give people freedom and autonomy to live 
full and developed identities. Legal recognition schemes should not force people to 
make decisions they otherwise would not have made, nor should it make them doubt 
the authenticity of their self for choosing not to alter their bodies. 73 
                                                
71	A.	Sharpe,	‘A	critique	of	the	Gender	Recognition	Act	2004’	(2007)	Journal	of	
Bioethical	Enquiry	4	pp.33-42	(p.33)	
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Not only is the lack of surgery requirement indicative of law better reflecting the lived 
reality of trans* lives and granting them more freedom and autonomy, it also exposes 
a shift in legal thinking around the concepts of sex and gender. It has been argued by 
Cowan that this is due to feminist and queer advancements in theorizing sex and 
gender.74 Feminist legal theory succeeded in separating sex from gender.75 This 
distinction allowed legal feminists to ‘argue for legal or political accommodation, for 
example, in the context of pregnancy and childbirth, on the grounds that in some ways 
women are biologically different from men’ whilst also arguing ‘that many of the 
perceived differences between men and women, often enshrined in legal texts and 
discourses, are socially constructed and, therefore, neither the proper basis for legal 
distinctions nor indeed immune to challenge or alteration.76  In other words, feminists 
used the distinction between sex and gender to show that the apparent differences 
between men and women (that were assumed to be natural and therefore a sound basis 
for providing differential treatment) were in fact part of gender roles. And because 
gender roles (ie femininity) were cultural and escapable, as opposed to natural and 
inevitable, they could therefore be altered in law and practice.   
 
Queer theory has also advanced thinking around sex and gender. Queer theorist 
Butler, for example, has argued that the gender side of this separation is per formative. 
77,i.e., the identity that gender expresses is fabricated. It is a process; a process that 
                                                
Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	UK.	(2016),	18	<	
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	 42	
involves ‘repeated, iterative performances, ritualized citations which produce and 
stabilize gender norms and effects.’78. Therefore, the general idea is that how we act 
determines who we are, rather than who we are determining how we act. This 
conception of gender instils a degree of autonomy into sexual identity and can make 
way for the creation and identification of genders beyond the binary. As Butler puts 
it, the conception of gender as performative can open the door for ‘cultural 
configurations of sex and gender [to] proliferate.’ 79 
 
Trans* legal recognition is quite clearly affected by these developments. Sandland, 
for example, points out, ‘it is a distinctly Butlerian approach which has been 
generalised in U.K. law by the s.9(1) of the 2004 Act.’80 The separation of sex and 
gender, and the performative nature of gender, has allowed legal sexual identity to not 
be solely dictated by sex (the body), but instead by other factors that are associated 
with the performative nature of gender. The law is no longer equating legal sex with 
biological characteristics. The biological ‘sex’ you were born with is no longer 
dictating the legal subjects’ identity. Legal subjects are now given more autonomy 
and freedom to author their own identity, rather than the body being destiny, as it was 
under Corbett. 
 
With the introduction of the GRA then, the focus of the law in determining legal sex 
has shifted from sex to gender. Rather than biological ‘sex’ being the fixed marker of 
identity, ‘gender’, the psychological and social, is now recognised. As stated, this is a 
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welcomed change as it now offers the opportunity for trans* people who cannot or 
chose not to physically alter their body to legally recognise their chosen gender. This 
is an illuminating example of how important, and useful, theory is in affecting legal 
developments. Nussbaum has criticized Butler for both her ‘exasperating’ prose and, 
most significantly, Butler’s version of feminism.81 In her view, Butler ignores the 
‘material suffering of women who are hungry, illiterate, violated, beaten’ in favor of 
focusing ‘narcissistically on personal self-presentation.’ 82 
 
Butler’s work, Nussbaum argues, is nothing more than a passive ‘hip quietism’83. 
Taking issue with Butler’s theorizing, Nussbaum states that ‘gays and lesbians do not 
achieve legal protection’ through intellectual endeavors like Butler.84 I suggest that 
Nussbaum undervalues the power of theory to reshape the world. Through a re-
conceptualization of the concepts of sex and gender, feminist and queer theorists like 
Butler have provided the theoretical foundation on which the GRA has based its 
reform.85 The substantive and real-life effects of this, for trans* people, have been 
documented above.  
 
However, although the separation of sex and gender has led to positive legal progress, 
this very distinction – and the law’s need to uphold it - unfortunately also underpins 
a number of problematic elements of the GRA. Although a biologically focussed 
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definition of sexual identity is no longer being enforced by law, a stable and – as will 
be argued, restrictive and uncompromising - definition is nevertheless being enforced. 
This hinders trans* autonomy and their freedom to identify the way they choose. The 
GRA and the provisions in section 9 demonstrate that law is still functioning to uphold 
a ‘truth’ of sex/gender and that it can be uncovered objectively. The GRA is based on 
one making that claim that one is in fact a true and authentic transsexual. The 
provisions contained in section 9 regulate and construct what an authentic trans* 
person is. Unfortunately, we will see, the particular definition of what it means to be 
trans* proscribed in the GRA has the effect of failing to recognise all self-identified 
trans* people while also continuing to pathologize them. Law enforces this definition 
through requiring that the applicant has or has had gender dysphoria, identifies 
unambiguously as a man or a woman, intends to identify that way for the rest of their 
life and has lived the life of that identification, socially, for at least a period of two 
years. Trans* people, if they want to seek recognition – and the material and 
psychological benefits that come with this – have no freedom or autonomy to depart 
from these terms. If an applicant fails to satisfy any of these criteria they are not 
considered to be ‘trans* enough’ and therefore will not be granted recognition.  
  
Taking these features of the Act together, it will be argued that despite the move 
toward queer incorporations (evidenced in the shift in focus from sex to gender by the 
lack of surgery requirement) the Act remains tied to the troubling theoretical aspects 
of Corbett around sex and gender and their relation to each other. The sex/gender 
distinction is still in place, leaving sex constructed as stable and immutable. The GRA,  
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‘falls into the same trap of Corbett, since it treats transsexuals as subjects to 
be identified according to a supposedly objective bio political criteria, regulated and 
treated as mentally disordered and then reassigned into a binary order which itself 
remains undisrupted.’86 
 
The GRA shifts the focus of sexual identity from sex to gender, accompanied by the 
welcomed effect that trans* individuals who cannot or do not have genital surgery are 
now recognised. However, although the focus has changed from sex to gender, the 
binary of sex and gender has remained in place.87 Whilst a system of recognition that 
has gender (over sex) as its priority benefits those who wish to change their legal 
gender without changing their body, it does not help dismantle the idea that there are 
only two, naturally and exclusively, sexes. In other words, it ‘does not in itself aid the 
long term aim of undermining the dichotomous and binary nature of sex and gender 
categories.’88 The problematic effect of this is that while gender is now being 
interrogated and deconstructed, the perception that sex is a scientific truth and is 
immutable remains. The ‘scientific truth’ of sex is that it is stable and binary. The 
result: any identity outside or beyond the binary is considered to be an anomaly or 
exception to the binary rule, as Sharpe has similarly argued: 
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‘reform that is channelled through categories other than sex enables law to 
distribute marginal groups around sex while maintaining intact a traditional and 
(bio)logical understanding of sex.’89  
 
Solely focussing on gender leaves the construction of ‘sex’ hidden, but there as 
dimorphic fact nonetheless. To put it another way, we are still relying on a ‘particular 
set of assumptions about the materiality of bodies and the relation this materiality has 
to gender.’ 90 Features of the Act are indicative of this: the requirement of a gender 
dysphoria diagnosis prior to recognition and the binary, the fact that only men and 
women can be recognised and the requirement that the applicant remain in their 
acquired gender ‘for life’. The gender dysphoria requirement will be explored first. 
 
Gender Dysphoria Requirement 
Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act provides that the GRP must grant the application if they 
are satisfied that the applicant has had gender dysphoria. Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) 
provide that the application must include medical reports which include details of the 
applicant’s diagnosis of gender dysphoria. Gender dysphoria is a mental health 
diagnosis which is associated with experiencing feelings discomfort or distress 
because there is a mismatch between one’s biological sex and gender identity.   There 
are two problematic effects of the diagnosis that will now be dealt with. Firstly, it 
pathologizes trans* people and secondly, it misses folk out. Both of these will be 
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explored before going onto explore the ways in which this requirement is indicative 
of legal thinking around sex and gender.  
 
Gender Dysphoria Pathologizes 
The GRA is progressive in that it does not defer to medical surgery prior to giving 
recognition. However, it nevertheless defers to medical criteria, broadly defined. It 
defers to psychology and psychoanalysis. Transsexualism is therefore medicalised by 
the gender dysphoria requirement. Transsexualism is not only medicalised, it is also 
pathologized. Gray has pointed out the link between medicalisation and 
pathologization: 
 
  ‘Medicalization brings it within the realm of medicine and pathologization 
renders it abnormal.’91 
 
A number of commentators have noted that a gender dysphoria diagnosis perpetuates 
the idea that transgender desires makes them mentally ill and establishes trans* wishes 
as pathological.92 Sandland for example, has stated that  
 
‘The GRA … figures the human rights of trans* person as flowing from the 
medical construction of transsexualism as mental illness.’93 
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To understand the way in which the diagnosis does this we must look closer at what 
it actually requires. The definition is not contained in the Act itself but guidance to its 
definition is found on the NHS website. The medical practitioner who is responsible 
for diagnosing a trans* individual will use either the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fifth Edition 
(DSM 5) or the World Health Organization’s International Statistical Classification 
of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10).  All three of these 
sources will be explored as all three are likely to have an influence on what is 
considered to constitute gender dysphoria. From the NHS website on gender 
dysphoria: 
 
 ‘Gender dysphoria is a condition where a person experiences discomfort or 
distress 
because there's a mismatch between their biological sex and gender identity … Some 
people with gender dysphoria have a strong and persistent desire to live according to 
their gender identity, rather than their biological sex … In most cases, this type of 
behavior is just part of growing up and will pass in time, but for those with gender 
dysphoria it continues  
through childhood and into adulthood … Adults with gender dysphoria can feel 
trapped inside a body that doesn't match their gender identity.’94 
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In DSM 5 the diagnostic criteria for GD in adolescents and adults provides that in 
order to diagnose there must be: 
 
‘[a] marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and 
assigned gender, of at least 6 months’ duration.’ 
 
 In addition, there must be two of the following present:  
 
1.  A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender 
and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics [...].  
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics 
because of a marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender 
[...].  
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the 
other gender.  
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different 
from one’s assigned gender).   
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender 
different from one’s assigned gender). 
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other 
gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).  
 
In addition to the above it is noted that ‘[t]he condition is associated with clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning.’ Elsewhere, in the IC-10 transsexualism is described as: 
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 ‘[d]esire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually 
accompanied by the wish to make one's body as congruent as possible with one's 
preferred sex through surgery and hormonal treatment.’95 
 
The desire, under this definition, must be present persistently for a period of at least 
two years. 96 Suffering is clearly a core aspect of GD; the words ‘distress’ and 
‘discomfort’ are used in both the DSM manual and the NHS definition of the 
condition. This is an oblique but harsh statement that strips trans* people of autonomy 
over their identification and makes the identification itself something that is 
undesirable and in need of authentication. As Nirta observes, the gender dysphoria 
requirement is ‘an insidious way of allowing a subtext which undermines the validity 
of trans* identity and makes it something objectionable and in need of constant 
validation.’97 It is clear from the definition of gender dysphoria that if you have it, 
there is something wrong with you. Gender dysphoria is ‘something one bears rather 
than something one is.’98 The message is clear: being trans* is not desirable. It turns 
desire into disorder and in need of medical attention. It is the negative connotations 
of the diagnosis that send this message. As Butler observes:   
 
                                                
95	ibid	
96	World	Health	Organization	International	Statistical	Classification	of	Diseases	and	
Related	Health	Problems	10th	Revision	(2010)	[online	version]	
<http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en>	[accessed	10	January	
2018]	
97	C.	Nirta,	Marginal	bodies:	Actualising	trans*	Utopias.	PhD	thesis,	University	of	
Westminster	(2014),	p.101	Accessed	at	
<https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/item/972vq/marginal-bodies-
actualising-trans-utopias>	
98	ibid	
	 51	
 ‘[t]o be diagnosed with [GD] is to be found, in some way, to be ill, sick, wrong, 
out of order, abnormal, and to suffer a certain stigmatization as a consequence of the 
diagnosis being given at all.’99 
 
It should be noted that the act uses the phrase gender dysphoria, as opposed to gender 
identity disorder and so in some respect the change in language (removal of the word 
disorder) is an improvement. Despite this name change though, the act of recognition 
is still posited as curative. Posited as curative, the connotations of correction, adaption 
and normalization are still there. It assumes that the body and innate sense of gender 
ought to be aligned and if they are not, there is something wrong with the person.  The 
effect of the gender dysphoria requirement in the GRA is that those who identify as a 
member of the sex opposite to the sex they were assigned at birth are not thought of 
as merely exhibiting natural gender variance but rather abnormal gender variance, 
something that is in need of treatment to alleviate their psychological suffering. The 
result is that many trans* individuals are subject to stigmatization and shame as a 
consequence of the diagnosis and it’s pathologizing connotations. The stigmatization 
of trans* people that the diagnosis achieves has been well documented.100 What is 
clear from this research is that the stigma that is attached to trans* gender 
identification being considered a mental health disorder has a detrimental effect, 
psychologically, on trans* people. Theilan, for example, has documented how the 
positing of gender variance as a mental illness is the route of many of the problems 
trans* people face in their day to day lives: 
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  ‘the stigma attached to mental illness does have an impact on the health of 
trans* persons… They face a myriad of problems in everyday life which stem 
precisely form the fact that transsexuality is not accepted as normal but rather regarded 
as something unusual, a deviation, a cause for concern – in short, an illness.’101 
 
This section has shown how the GRA retains a medicalised and pathologized 
approach to gender variance that existed back in the 1970s with Corbett. Law 
continues to situate the problem of gender in the minds of the trans* person, rather 
than in the construction of sex/gender. In other words, the gender problem is ‘in the 
minds of the ill’ not in the construction of what is normal and healthy. The 
construction of normative sex ensures that the gender dysphoria requirement is 
needed. For trans* people to be recognized in way that does not upset the current 
gender order, the law positions them as pathological exceptions to the binary. 
 
Before moving on, it must be noted that the diagnosis of gender dysphoria has support 
among some trans* people. Whilst many share the view above that the diagnosis acts 
to pathologize and fails to reflect the reality of trans* experience, some trans* folk 
have nevertheless developed ‘what one might call a stance of grudging acceptance 
towards the status quo: they dislike it, but they do not dispute it.’102  The gender 
dysphoria diagnosis currently facilitates access to a variety of medical procedures that, 
if carried out through a private route would become unaffordable to many. Without 
the diagnosis trans* people fear that access to trans* specific health care may be 
adversely affected. Surgery, for example, if viewed as elective rather than necessary 
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may not be covered by the NHS. However, the position taken here is that this ‘access 
to healthcare’ argument is not convincing. Firstly, the trade-off – that is, gaining 
access to free healthcare at the expense of submitting oneself to pathologizing 
language – is not worth it. Many trans* are of the view that pathologization is a small 
price to pay if it leads to the surgery that they desire.103 However, this argument 
assumes (again) the narrow definition of what it means to be trans*. Not all trans* 
people want surgery.104 The gender dysphoria requirement affects all trans* people.  
The above argument does not consider the fact that a significant number of trans* 
people do not wish, or cannot have, surgery. Recall that transsexuality tends to refer 
to someone who has a desire to change sex through genital surgery, transgender to 
someone who may not desire surgery and trans*to both groups. This is important, 
because pathologization is not restricted to transsexuality, but extends to all trans* 
persons.  A lot of transgender people have no interest in hormone treatment or 
operations. For example, Stonewall UK recently reported that one in ten trans people 
don’t want any form of medical intervention.105 The point is that the alleged positive 
effects of gender dysphoria do not extend to all those persons affected by its negative 
effects.106 The group of people affected by trans* specific health care is smaller than 
the group affected by trans* pathologization by way of gender dysphoria diagnosis. 
Elliot has critiqued the stance this thesis takes on the matter, arguing that it ‘negates’ 
transsexual’s desires.107 I do not wish to do this. Transsexuals (those who do want 
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104	see	p.39	above	
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[accessed	12	September	2018]	
106	J.	Butler,	Undoing	Gender,	2004	at	p.267	
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surgery) desires are real and their interests are important. However, because being 
trans* and the desire for an operation are not as closely linked as commonly believed, 
the health care argument should not be enough to justify acceptance of gender 
dysphoria requirement.  Of course, if the GD requirement is to go, we should first put 
in place another mechanism that allows trans* folk to access to health care: 
 
‘it would be wrong to call for its eradication without first putting into place a 
set of structures through which transitioning can be paid for and legal status 
attained.’108  
 
I agree. However, as Butler points out, there is no reason that trans*-specific health 
care should require a diagnosis. The elimination of gender dysphoria should not have 
to interfere with trans* specific health care. Having a disease is not a necessary 
condition of being afforded health care. Chapter three will argue in more detail that 
the best model of legal recognition is one that best gives trans* folk autonomy and 
freedom to author their own lives whilst at the same time providing them with the 
protection and rights that are important to them.  
 
The Diagnosis Excludes 
As demonstrated, Gender dysphoria implies some level of personal distress and/or 
discomfort. However, the reality is that many trans* individuals do not feel the 
appropriate amount of discomfort or distress that is required by the diagnosis. It has 
been suggested by Whittle that a ‘well-adjusted’ trans* person would be outside the 
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clinical definition.109 GD ignores the fact that many trans* people do not feel gender 
dysphoria. Trans* narratives are full of a myriad of other feelings towards gender that 
are experienced beside just dysphoria. One of which, for example, is: 
 
‘gender euphoria, which is a feeling of rightness, completeness, and well-
being trans* people sometimes feel when their body or how their perceived reflects 
what they consider to be their true self.’110  
 
Focussing on the distress of trans* people ignores the many other feelings that can 
often come with being trans*. Being trans* does not always mean experiencing a 
persistent and vivid revulsion towards aspects of your body and gender, it can also 
materialise, for example, as having more positive feelings towards the idea of living 
in another gender. Trans* people today become aware of trans* literature and 
narratives before they come to perceive or accept themselves as trans*. They, 
accordingly, do not view dysphoria as being a necessary requirement to being trans*: 
 
 ‘Legal recognition of gender identity – trans, non-binary, or otherwise – 
should never be dependent upon the experience of dysphoria. It is very possible to 
have a different gender identity without dysphoria…’111 
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https://everydayfeminism.com/2015/06/these-5-myths-about-body-dysphoria-in-
trans*-folks-are-super-common-but-also-super-wrong/	>	[accessed	10	January	
2018]	
111	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	UK.	(2016),	77	<	
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As a result of this, feelings of distress around their identity are minimal. Weisse’, for 
example, narrative is as follows: 
 
  ‘I never experience the distress of feeling like I had the wrong body. I just 
wholly disagreed with the idea of labelling people men and women based on the 
bodies they have.’112 
 
Due to the increasing awareness of trans* issues and ease of access to trans* narratives 
and literature, more and more trans* folk are aware that it is not their body or minds 
that are wrong but the sex/gender system that they were born into. Gender dysphoria 
is therefore no longer an acceptable test for deciding whether someone is trans* or 
not.  
 
The conception of sex and gender under Gender Dysphoria 
The requirement that the applicant must have or has had gender dysphoria diagnosis 
prior to gaining gender recognition in law is indicative of law’s thinking around sex 
and gender. It will be demonstrated that law is still thinking bodies in terms of the 
sex/gender distinction and truth of sex, much like it did in Corbett. The central tenet 
of the concept of gender dysphoria is a ‘dissonance between sex (the body) and gender 
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identity (the mind).’113  The NHS website, for example, describes gender dysphoria 
as follows: ‘there's a mismatch between their biological sex and gender identity.’114 
 
In addition, both the DSM and the IC-10 make reference to an incongruence within 
the patient as an indicator of gender dysphoria. This feeling of 
dissonance/incongruence assumes that sex and gender are separate entities. It is an 
incongruence between the body (sex) and the mind (gender). As explored above, there 
are many trans* narratives that do not feel incongruence or do not believe in 
distinction between body and mind or physical sex and gender. As Hine points out, 
many participants in her research felt deeply unsatisfied by the wrong body 
account.115 Participants in Hines research state that their gender transition is a much 
more complex and nuanced process than the wrong body account assumes:  
 
‘It's [transition] been a progression. It's never been fixed from the outset and 
I've never had those overwhelming feelings of being in the wrong body. There's 
always been fluidity in my feelings.’116 
 
 
The gender dysphoria diagnosis demands a coherent narrative from the trans* 
applicant. It does not favor ambiguousness, fluidity or uncertainty in relation to gender 
                                                
113	S.	Hines,	TransForming	Gender:	Transgender	Practices	of	Identity,	Intimacy	and	
Care	(Bristol:	Policy	Press,	2007)	p.60	
114	NHS,	Gender	Dysphoria,	2016	<	https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/gender-
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identity, something that is experienced by many.117 Moreover, the definitions of the 
diagnosis all require a degree of gender solidity from the applicant, either of a period 
of 6 months, two years or from childhood into adulthood. The diagnosis wants to 
establish that an applicant’s sense of gender is relatively permanent and stable.  
 
The requirement of gender dysphoria makes sense when we consider the normative 
underpinnings of the GRA. Insofar as law functions to uphold the idea that sex and 
gender are distinct and that there is a stable and unquestionable ‘truth’ of sex that is 
to be determined, some sort of method is necessary for determining whether a trans* 
person really does have the identity they claim to have. The gender dysphoria 
requirement is the chosen method used by law in the GRA. The gender dysphoria 
requirement exposes that the GRA is based on the assumption that there is a ‘true’ sex 
of the applicant: it is feelings of dysphoria that is the manifestation of that ‘true sex’ 
that law demands. As long as sex is assumed to be a stable and objectionable fact, the 
need for a definition of what it means to be trans* will remain.  
 
The account of what it feels like to be trans* as contained in the gender dysphoria 
diagnosis is in conflict with queer developments on of sex and gender. Queer 
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developments on sex and gender question the distinction the between sex and gender 
that posits gender as the performative and sex as the stable and natural given.118 Queer 
advancements in how we understand gender and sexual identities can provide the 
underpinnings of a new recognition model.119 Once it is acknowledged that there is 
no truth of sex, law will no longer require such a rigid and prescriptive definition of 
what constitutes being trans*. The analysis that there is no truth of sex or gender need 
not contradict or invalidate those narratives of transsexuals who view their feelings of 
gender as innate, fixed and real. 120As Serano clarifies, to say that something is 
constructed is not to say that it is ‘not real’ or not genuinely felt.121 What it does mean 
however is that what it means to be trans* can be refigured so that it does not route 
through an authentic/inauthentic framework.  
 
Two year requirement 
Section (2) (1) (b) contains yet another provision that demonstrates that law is 
regulating trans* subjectivity through an authentic transsexual narrative, a narrative 
which is underpinned by problematic conceptions of sex and gender. This section 
requires that for recognition to be granted, the applicant must have: 
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 ‘lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years ending with 
the date on which the application is made.’122 
 
This provision has the effect of requiring trans* persons to perform gender stability 
and permanence. If they are unable to do so, recognition is denied. During these two 
years, applicants must perform their gender in a certain way; in a stable manner that 
is either unambiguously female or unambiguously male. This pressure can cause fear 
and anxiety with applicants often worrying that they are not producing gender in a 
way that is ‘trans* enough.’ Feelings of not being trans* enough is prevalent within 
the trans* community. Gendered Intelligence, an online resource for trans* discuss 
how expectations from within and out with the trans* community can make trans 
people feel like they are ‘not trans enough.’123 Thus, any shifts or changes felt in their 
gender identity during this time must be rejected in order to achieve the required 
stability for recognition. This acts to ensure that it is only the binary male and female 
genders that exist as they approach recognition. Any ambiguousness in relation to 
sexual identity is coalesced into a binary framework in this two year period. It is clear 
that this provision is underpinned by the construction of sex. This requirement 
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compels subjects to live in one of two genders only, eliding the complexity and 
ambiguity of people’s gendered selves. This upholds the construction of the binary. 
The law’s desire to preserve and perpetuate this construction - at the expense of 
allowing more space for people to explore themselves - is again evidence that too little 
respect is being given to trans* freedom and autonomy in the current regime. 
 
Gender Permanence Requirement  
The GRA, through the gender dysphoria requirement and the two-year requirement, 
constructs a trans* identity which trans* people must align themselves with if they 
are to gain recognition. In addition to constructing a trans* identity that is 
pathological, stable and that is within the binary, the GRA also designates an identity 
which is to be permanent post recognition. Section 2 (1) (c) of the GRA requires that 
the individual must intend to live in the acquired gender until death. This gender 
permanence provision of the GRA functions to regulate trans* lives by requiring that 
their first gender transition remains their only transition. Again, this is a regulation 
that is underpinned by law’s need to uphold particular conceptions of sex and gender, 
again at the expense of trans* persons’ freedom and autonomy. Law is attempting to 
reproduce a binary gender order despite the fact that the existence of fluid, non-binary 
trans* lives illuminate how this no longer holds. The fact that law requires permanent 
- even if apparently non-surgical - gender crossings, shows this.  If individuals are to 
‘change gender’, then this transition should be final and irreversible. The Act serves 
to reproduce a more general legal reluctance to contemplate gender in non-binary 
ways. In addition, the requirement is not practical, as there is no actual restriction on 
whether one could apply again for a different gender. Finally, the symbolic power of 
‘until death’ creates a narrative of mistakes. The Act is requiring trans* citizens to 
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perform (and produce) gender permanence that is at odds with the idea that sex/gender 
is fluid and unstable, which will be explored further in Chapter two.  
 
Only men and woman recognized 
As stated, the gender permanence signifies the general legal reluctance to consider the 
possibility of beyond the binary gender. This reluctance is most obvious when you 
consider the fact that the act only recognises male and female genders. The Act allows 
for a change of gender within the binary: any gender that is out with the binary is not 
recognised.  Although the act is evidence of gender being increasingly accepted as 
having a psychological component, it nevertheless masks sex behind the ‘veneer of 
scientific and, therefore, unquestionable objectivity’124. This has the result of forcing 
people into one of two essentialist binary identities of either ‘male’ or ‘female’ and 
ignores those who consider themselves to be beyond the binary. For instance, one 
trans* research participant in Hines research describes themselves as follows: 
 
‘I am very gendered. I have a lot of gender and that expresses itself in a lot of 
different ways, whereas other people don’t. They stay at one point but with me I’m 
kind of moving around [...] There’s lots of different levels so there’s not just one way 
in which I describe my identity. I’ve called myself a gender terrorist; I’ve called 
myself intersex by design, an intentional mutation, FtM, but not transsexual, and FtM 
is more about how people perceive me. I call myself a hermaphrodite sometimes. I’ve 
been a lesbian or a dyke, I’ve been a queer dyke. Queer is probably the term I feel 
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best describes me. I could call myself a queer trannie boy. Everything is qualified in 
one way or another [laugh].’125 
 
The binary underpinnings of the act offer no space to these rich, complex and nuanced 
narratives. The refusal to recognize them undermines the validity of the identities and 
helps perpetuate violence, hostility and doubt towards them. Although the law now 
allows for movement across the binary of male/female, the identities in-between and 
beyond male and female, such as transgendered, intersexed, gender fluid, bigendered, 
non-binary and androgynous, remain outside the current framework of recognition 
under the GRA. The option for those that identify in terms like these are as follows: 
either jettison recognition completely - and face the risks that come with this - or apply 
for recognition and give up your specificity, autonomy and subject yourself to 
pathologizing language in the process. Recognition law should not require subjects to 
choose between these two unacceptable options. The binary logic of the GRA cannot 
recognize the diversity of trans* identities as they are variously experienced and 
expressed. Therefore, rather than widening recognition in relation to gender diversity, 
the Act instead is ultimately ‘a conservative move’126 which assimilates trans* 
experience to reinforce the normative gender binary system. Finally, the binary 
underpinnings of act also have the effect of creating a ‘discourse of mistakes’ in 
relation to individuals wanting to change gender more than once.127 Only men and 
woman are recognised by the GRA. This, coupled with the reality that transition is 
thought under the Act as a shift from one gender to the other, with no acknowledgment 
of the space in between, ensures that gender fluidity, uncertainty or ambiguousness is 
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impossible. Shifts or changes in gender post recognition are therefore considered to 
be a mistake. As will be shown in the following chapters however, the sex/gender 
system can be reconceptualised so that a desire for multiple genders, fluid genders, 
ambiguous genders or beyond the binary gender is accepted as simply another human 
variance as opposed to pathological exceptions or mistake. Reconceptualised this 
way, this new sex/gender system can ensure that law functions to give more respect 
to trans* freedom and autonomy.  
 
Conclusion 
The positive and negative implications of the GRA have been explored along with the 
construction of gender and sex that underpin it, which has been exposed by its terms. 
What constitutes a ‘true sex change’ and therefore who is deemed an ‘authentic 
transsexual’ has changed in law as the discourse around sex and gender has developed. 
While the GRA allows for the socially constructed nature of gender to be put at the 
focus in the determination of legal sex, the construction of sex as dimorphic fact 
remains. The set of criteria that is laid down in the provisions of the Act are evidence 
of the law’s need to uphold the sex/gender binary. Currently, the terms of the GRA 
stipulate that the authentic transsexual: is dysphoric and that this has been felt 
persistently, has a stable gender identity that is within in the binary and intends to 
remain stable for the rest of their life.  It is suggested that this criterion is problematic. 
It is problematic because firstly, it pathologizes and excludes trans* people from legal 
recognition. Secondly, it is grounded in conceptions of sex and gender that are no 
longer justified in light of queer developments on sex/gender and in light of the 
difficulties and struggles trans* people face in everyday life. A reconfiguration of 
these concepts is needed to better understand and reflect trans* subjectivity in law and 
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to allow them to live the life they want to live.  The construction of sex and the 
separation of sex and gender that underpins the Act is in contradiction with queer 
developments on sexed embodiment. An incorporation of these developments can 
enable law to disconnect recognition from the claim to authenticity and toward a more 
transformative and fluid recognition law that can better respect trans*	freedom and 
autonomy over their gender journey. Chapter two introduces the concept of 
‘becoming’ which will de-essentialize the body and enable a move in this direction.  
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CHAPTER 2 
‘becoming’ 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter one tracked the development of trans* gender recognition law in the UK from 
Corbett up until the GRA. The problematic features of the GRA (the requirement of 
gender dysphoria; the two year provision; the for life requirement and the fact that 
only men and women are recognised) were explored. It has been suggested that it is a 
particular conceptualisation of sex and gender and their relation to each other that 
underpins these features of the act. It is clear that the law, through the regulation and 
constitutional mechanisms of the GRA is seeking to uphold the gender binary with 
not enough respect given to trans* freedom and autonomy. Chapter one ended with 
the view that it is a re-conceptualisation of sex and gender that is needed in order to 
justify the removal of the problematic elements of the GRA and to move towards 
allowing people more space to author their own gendered lives.   Chapter two 
introduces the concept of ‘becoming’ and explores in detail the ways in which it can 
re-think the concepts of sex, gender and time. These new concepts can refigure what 
it means to be trans* in law. ‘Becoming’, by refiguring trans* subjectivity, can 
ultimately make space for a more nuanced model of recognition and allow for a wider 
range of gender subjects to be recognised in law. I will use Gatens’ critique of the 
sex/gender binary and show how this provides fertile ground to re-imagine sexed 
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bodies in law.128 This re-imagining, it will be shown, calls for the removal of the 
problematic features of the act discussed in Chapter one and can also offer suggestions 
of alternative ways of providing recognition to trans* folk in law. Essentially, trans* 
identities can be awarded recognition notwithstanding any claim to ‘authenticity.’ In 
addition to the deconstruction of sex/gender binary, I will also explore how 
‘becoming’ challenges the construction of the concept of ‘time’ that is contained in 
the act, which will also necessitate the refiguring of our conception of trans* 
subjectivities. A reconceptualization of time, that is; away from ‘straight’ conceptions 
of it towards incorporations of queer temporal frameworks, recognises the temporal 
complexity of trans* subjectivity and can ground a recognition model that better 
contends with this.  
 
 
Sex/Gender binary critique 
Gatens’ critique of the sex/gender binary can be used as providing grounds for the re-
imagining of sexed bodies and therefore what it means to be trans*. Gatens’ critique 
is two pronged; she deconstructs sex and also questions the relationship between sex 
and gender.129  As explored in Chapter one, feminism succeeded in separating sex 
from gender which has allowed for important progress in law to be made, to the 
benefit of both women and trans* folk. Most notably for the trans* community, the 
separation allowed gender to be put at the focus in the GRA which meant that legal 
sexual identity no longer need be solely dictated by biological sex. This is evidenced 
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in the act by the fact that recognition of acquired gender is granted to applicants 
without any surgical procedures having been carried out on them. However, despite 
this undoubtedly welcomed feature of the Act, the separation of sex and gender also 
underpins a number of problematic elements of the act. The requirement of gender 
dysphoria, the requirement of gender permanence and the fact that only men and 
women are recognised are all dependant on the separation of sex and gender. A 
critique of the sex/gender binary however can provide fertile ground to re-imagine 
sexed embodiment, what it means to be trans* and therefore challenge the current 
gender recognition law provisions.  
 
What is sexed embodiment? According to Gatens’ theory, as long as we have the 
sex/gender binary as the starting point in our theorising, the answer to this question is 
limited to either gender (culture) or sex (biology).130 The latter answer pervaded much 
of legal thinking from the Corbett judgement up until the introduction of the GRA, 
with the courts holding that legal sex is determined at birth through a congruence of 
biological features. The former view, that a person’s gender identity can be 
determined without recourse to their body, is now at the focus in the GRA. 
Historically, sexed embodiment has therefore been deemed to be caused by either 
primarily biological sex or primarily cultural gender. Both, we have seen, do not 
adequately represent trans* lives in all their complexity and consequentially do not 
provide a sound underpinning for trans* recognition law.  Neither a purely biological 
or purely cultural analysis can be a sufficient means of establishing the gender identity 
of someone. Theorising gender identity in terms of purely biology suffers from 
biological determinism. Whereas putting gender at the focus of sexed identity leaves 
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sex concealed, but accepted as a dimorphic biological fact nevertheless. In other 
words, ‘gender produces the misnomer of a prediscursive “sex”’131 It ‘assumes the 
existence of sex as some pure thing in itself.’ 132  Whilst a system of recognition that 
has gender (over sex) as its priority benefits those who wish to change their legal 
gender without changing their body, it ‘does not in itself aid the longterm aim of 
undermining the dichotomous and binary nature of sex and gender categories.’133 To 
put it another way, it leaves sex unconstructed. As Sharpe has argued,  
 
‘reform that is channelled through categories other than sex enables law to 
distribute marginal groups around sex while maintaining intact a traditional and 
(bio)logical understanding of sex.’134  
 
These detrimental effects of having sexed embodiment as either sex or as gender were 
explored in more detail in Chapter one.  
 
Fortunately, sexed embodiment can be alternatively understood in a way that does not 
require a choice between either sex or gender at the exclusion of the other. The cause 
of sexed embodiment is much more complex than the binary presumes and therefore 
can be thought in a way that is not reduced to the simplistic choice between nature or 
nurture. A number of theorists have convincingly argued that the line between nature 
and nurture, between biology and culture, between sex and gender cannot be easily 
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drawn.135 These theorists have challenged the oppositions of nature and culture, of 
sex and gender. Neither solely biology, nor solely culture, it is argued, can provide a 
definitive truth on what constitutes sexed embodiment. A framework where one 
supplants or overrules the truth of the other is therefore limited. Rather, sexed 
embodiment can be explored more productively if we consider it to be both biology 
and culture acting as figural resources together. Together, because both domains are 
in fact complexly intertwined and emerge together interactively; the separation of 
biology and culture is impossible as they interpenetrate.  We should not have a 
definitional separation between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. Rather, what is needed is an 
account of them that emphasize instead ‘their exceedingly complex interdependent 
definitional status.’ 136 Sex and gender are so interwoven that it is more accurate to 
talk of them as one thing. 137 Acknowledgment of this entanglement has the result that 
gender is no longer the focus when seeking to understand trans* lives, as is currently 
the case in the GRA. As explored in Chapter one, directing attention to the 
construction of gender has the effect of leaving the assumed naturalness of biological 
sex undisturbed. It is clear that an investigation of sex and biology, as well as gender, 
must be brought back into our theorising to fully recognise the complexity of trans* 
sexed embodiment. Understandably, however, a return to biology – a field which has 
so often been utilised by law to the detriment of both women and trans* people, 
including in the case of Corbett – has been met with fear and uncertainty. Yet, biology 
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can be brought back to the focus in our investigations in a way that avoids the 
biological determinism of the past. 
 
Re-addressing Biology 
Feminist writer Frost has explored why feminists may be ‘ambivalent and uncertain’ 
towards incorporating biological research into feminism. 138 The same anxiety, it can 
be said, is felt within the trans* community. This is understandable. Both women and 
trans* people have worked hard to dispel the ‘biology is destiny’ logic that has 
underpinned much of the discrimination and invalidation against both groups. For 
example, biological determinism has allowed in the case of Corbett, discussed above, 
for the argument that your gender identity is based on biology and is fixed at birth, 
with no consideration given to one’s self-identified gender or the alteration of one’s 
primary or secondary sex characteristics. 139 It has been used, more recently, to 
support the argument that post-operative transgender women are actually men.140 
When it comes to re-addressing biology in our theorising, the concern is that the 
incorporation of scientific findings would result in the reaffirmation of science as 
‘proper’ knowledge. In other words, there is the fear that this move would perpetuate 
the cultural authority that has so often been given to scientific knowledge in 
comparison to other kinds of discourse. Many feminists, such as Cornell ‘carefully 
avoid discussion of the biological the natural, and the real as if they in some way 
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detract from or mitigate the cultural and political issues at hand.’ 141 The success of 
the GRA for gender recognition, too, is also reasons for ambivalence. Recall that it 
was cultural deconstructionist arguments that helped carve out recognition for gender 
in law. The worry is that these developments - and the critical cultural analysis 
arguments that achieved them - would be overwritten by a turn to biology.  To put it 
another way, the fear is that biological findings could be used to ‘deprioritize or give 
a counterbalance to the dominant forms of cultural deconstruction’142 that has led to 
positive legal development for trans* lives.  
 
However, whilst gender being put at the focus certainty had positive legal effects, the 
negative effect was that an investigation of the body was neglected. The result is a 
stable, immutable and essentialized body lurking below the surface of the GRA. The 
critical facilities that have been so useful in our analysis of gender to understand 
embodiment must now be extended to our turn to science and the body. The body 
needs to be refigured. Frost points out that in, 
 
‘our analyses of how culture shapes bodies, contemporary feminists have 
developed wonderfully complex figures and tropes for talking about social, political, 
symbolic, and linguistic forms of inter-relatedness, influence, and association.’143  
 
Yet, this critical eye must also be directed to the body in theorizing trans* embodiment 
in law.  We need to develop ‘an equivalent set of languages, models, logics, and 
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concepts’144 to that of culture in order to ‘think expansively or incisively across the 
porous boundaries of cells, organisms, and their environments.’145 By doing this, we 
can begin to move away from the body as a constructed spatial and inert figure and 
towards a figuration of it as an open-ended system; ‘as process-oriented figure in 
which the permeable body continually absorbs and responds to an environment as it 
engages and changes it.’146 A number of theorists are taking this nuanced approach to 
sexed embodiment.147 
 
A nuanced approach 
There are ways in which we can incorporate biological findings into the theorising of 
trans* bodies without fear that it will result in a return to biological determinism. 
Gatens’ critique not only involves the deconstruction of sex – i.e. to bring the focus 
and investigation back onto biology. Rather, it is two pronged; Gatens’ also 
dismantles the sex/gender binary. This dismantling questions ‘the distinction between 
the real body (sex) and its meaningful sexuality.’148 Taking both parts of Gatens’ 
critique together it is clear that by bringing biological findings back into our focus, 
we are not simply carrying out a reversal of the way we have been theorising sexed 
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embodiment (“naturally” as opposed to culturally caused). Rather, we are challenging 
the ‘implicit sense of their distinction.’149 In other words, rather than shifting the 
balance or dynamic between sex and gender, the separation of them is dismantled. 
With the distinction eliminated, biology can no longer conceivably be used as a factual 
resource. Instead, it is used as a figural one.  Serrano for example, a trans* woman 
and biologist, uses biology as a figural resource to allow her to investigate the effect 
of brain cells and processes on gender development whilst at the same time refusing 
to accord these scientific findings the status of determinative fact.150 Citing a number 
of scientific references to argue that biology does in fact have an impact on gender 
development, she notes that there is ‘some evidence to suggest that our gender 
identities are influenced by biology.’151 Yet, although she acknowledges the necessity 
of investigating the processes of how our brain cells - and the hormone receptors they 
have - affect sexual development, Serano stops short of concluding that this is the 
whole story: ‘none of us can say precisely what effects these hormones elicit in our 
brain.’152  Serano therefore turns to biology as a resource but refuses to conclude that 
it ‘wholly determines our gender, just that it seems to have an influence on it.’153 
Moreover, involved in her research is also an analysis of how ‘social gender’ has an 
effect on our biology. Cultural influences impact biology in her research: ‘our brains 
physically change in response to our experiences.’154 One of the virtues of Serano’s 
research then, is her account of how the biological and the social interact.   
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Through displacing the ever-present fiction that biological and social, nature and 
culture, sex and gender are distinct, we can re-imagine what it means to be alive in 
this world. As Roberts observes, by tracking ‘the complex inter- relations of the 
biological and the social’ we can create new forms of refiguration of what we are as 
living creatures. 155 Through the re-coordinating of our conception of the relationship 
between concepts, by recognising the developmental interaction between biology and 
culture, we can radically transform how we view sexed bodies.   
 
Binary Gender 
An understanding of sex and gender in terms of ‘becoming’ contrasts to how these 
phenomena are understood in the GRA. The GRA is underpinned by the essentialist 
construction of sex and the strict demarcation of sex and gender. Whilst the act is 
evidence of gender being increasingly accepted as having a psychological component, 
the separation of sex and gender nevertheless masks sex behind the ‘veneer of 
scientific and, therefore, unquestionable objectivity’156. These underpinnings of the 
GRA are exposed by the fact that it is only male and female that are recognised. That 
is, the Act allows for a change of gender within the binary and any gender that is out 
with or beyond the binary is unrecognisable. The GRA is based on the presumption 
that bodies can be divided into only two sexes. Any bodies that do not fall easily 
within this binary are positioned as exceptions and anomalies that are in need of 
regulation and management. The act lets people change genders but in a regulated and 
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controlled way that leaves the binary of sex intact and curtails trans* person’s freedom 
and autonomy by limiting who and what gender can be or become. Yet, the insights 
from Gatens’ critique above allow us to contend with the argument that bodies cannot 
neatly be divided into two distinct sexes. The re-configuration of sex and gender 
explored above unsettles the biologically based male/female binary that has been used 
by both medicine and law to distinguish and organise bodies. The body thought as an 
open-ended organism that continually absorbs and responds to its surroundings is 
uncontained by the male/female binary which depended on the biological construction 
of sex as separated from cultural gender. In its current form, the GRA thinks sexual 
difference though a binary framework. Sex difference, under this binary rule is 
understood is a difference of kind. What I mean by this is that gender identity is, 
 
 ‘constructed by a comparative activity in which male and female are perceived 
and positioned as alternative categories, so that belonging to one necessarily entails a 
discourse that highlights non- belonging to the other.’157  
 
Under the binary rule of sex difference each category relies on the other to define 
itself. For example, man is defined as not woman and woman is defined as not man. 
These guarded binary categories also have the effect of ensuring that trans* identities 
are placed in opposition to them. That is, the naturalized gender binary also has the 
effect of defining transgender as not cisgender and cisgender is defined against what 
is not trans*.  Not only does this position trans* and women as subordinate, it also has 
the effect of eliding everyone’s specificity. 
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However, refiguring the body offers a new way to think about sexual difference. 
Rather than thinking difference through binaries and hierarchies, a process orientated 
figure thinks gender as a multiplicity of difference. Gender as having a multiplicitous 
nature breaks free of the constrain of binary sex difference which recognized only 
male and female and instead considers gender to be a proliferation of processes. 
Thought this way, gender is opened up so that multiple and variable genders beyond 
male and female are recognized. Sexual difference need not be constrained to the 
binary forms in which we currently know them.  
 
Fausto-Sterling recognizes that the body can be divided up into more than two sexes. 
Her research on variations in sexual morphology shows that the seeming naturalness 
of the binary sex classification system is untrue.158 Her research demonstrates that at 
both the level of the molecular and at the social, the division of bodies into two makes 
little sense. Biological findings are important in her analysis – she uses them to 
demonstrate the body can be divided up in five ways – but, crucially, they are utilised 
on the understanding that they are inescapably intertwined with the cultural. Sterling 
doesn’t just deconstruct sex, i.e. swap the truth of two sexes with truth of five sexes, 
in her analysis, there are multiple and varied active forces - biological and cultural 
processes together -  that contribute to the development of sex and gender identity.159 
Her research therefore also involves an investigation of the relationship between the 
‘biological’ and ‘cultural’ phenomena to allow her to use biology as a figural resource.  
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Butler has also argued for the division of bodies beyond the binary. In her book 
chapter ‘What about Hormones?’160 Butler explores the widely held view that the 
existence of hormones supports the division of sexed bodies into exclusively male and 
female. Proponents of this view argue: 
 
‘that there are, minimally, sexually differentiated parts, activities, capacities, 
hormonal and chromosomal differences that can be conceded without reference to 
‘‘construction’’’161  
 
The immutability of someone’s chromosomes has been reiterated in several cases 
concerning the determination of someone’s legal sex.162 However, the insight that 
nature and culture are not distinct highlights how this argument is misguided. To say 
that hormones are unaffected by construction suggests that there is a sense that ‘deep 
within the body there is an untouchable core of biological-ness.163 In other words, it 
assumes that there is a natural core that is unreachable and completely distinct from 
culture. The suggestion that hormones are purely biological assumes a strict 
demarcation of biology from culture. As we have explored, a re-figuration of the body 
as constituted by the active force of nature and culture together collapses the 
distinction between biology and culture and therefore breaks down the male/female 
binary which depends on the distinction. Butler in her argument against the sex/gender 
binary has demonstrated that we can never access the ‘thing in itself’ – in this case 
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hormones - of objective reality. Hormones are not just there, waiting to be objectively 
discovered. For example, a scientist, with political inclinations, biases and 
presumptions (ie “cultural” influences) discovered these hormones. After this, they 
were given a certain meaning, organised in a certain way and then used as criteria to 
divide the body into two sexes. Hormones, as we know them, are unavoidably a 
construct. These features have been inscribed with meaning that goes far beyond 
anything warranted by biology. The particularly sexual meaning that they have been 
naturally inscribed with has been questioned. Sterling for example, asks:  
 
‘Why, then, have hormones always been strongly associated with the idea of 
sex, when, in fact, “sex hormones” apparently affect organs throughout the entire 
body and are not specific to either gender?’164 
 
Hormones are not naturally sexed. Rather, what happens is that we mark certain 
chemicals as ‘female’ and ‘male’ as: 
 
‘a convenient way to describe their involvement in certain sexual reproductive 
processes, and then we overlook the non-reproductive, and thus, nonsexual functions 
they direct.’165  
 
Shrage adds to this by describing the way in which we ignore evidence and research 
that suggests that ‘sex hormones’ are a misnomer in that they also play a role in non-
sexual aspects of the body.  Consequentially, bodies  
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‘become female and male by virtue of the presence of their respective female 
and male chemicals, and chemicals take on female and male properties by virtue of 
their presence in bodies we read as female and male.’ 166 
 
In other words, as Shrage observes, ‘our sex concepts are logically circular.’167 What 
body features and functions we choose to categories as male or female come already 
intertwined in our ideas around gender. What we anticipate to see is affected by our 
cultural notions about gender and therefore affects what we end up classifying as 
characteristics that are sexual. 
 
It is for this reason above – the logical circularity of our sex concepts - that we then 
find it difficult to explain the presence of ‘male’ hormones in female bodies and 
‘female’ hormones in male bodies. This finding of circularity is crucial for 
understanding the earlier critique of law. When faced with the reality that trans* lives 
may disrupt the sex/gender system, law’s response is to explain these bodies away as 
pathological exceptions and assimilate them into the current gender order. Not only 
does the naturalised binary have the effect of subordinating women and eliding 
everyone’s gender specificity then, it also positions all genders that are out with the 
binary as abnormal deviations.  Rather than the existence of these bodies making us 
question the binary rule and consider alternatives to it, law has treated these cases as 
anomalies that prove the rule. Those who do not fall neatly into either category fail to 
count as ‘bodies’ and are deemed less than human. This plays out in the regulation, 
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control and pathologisation of trans* bodies through mechanisms within the GRA 
which ignores the need to respect trans* autonomy and freedom in favour of retaining 
the binary order.  
 
It is clear then, from the problems explored above, that biology must be brought back 
into our theorising. As explained, the recognition of biology as a useful resource need 
not require the repudiation of all other forces involved in sexed embodiment. Instead 
of avoiding biology as a resource in helping to explain trans* lives, we can embrace 
it. There is no need to be apprehensive of this move as long as the findings are used 
as figural, not as determinative fact. Using biology as a figural resource acknowledges 
that it is an active agent in constituting sexed embodiment whilst also refusing to 
accord it some sort of priori status, or a clear-cut determining role. Bringing biology 
back in does not necessitate us saying that sexed embodiment is biology alone but 
rather it is both biology and culture, that constitute us as living creatures. In other 
words, as Sterling puts it, we are ‘100% nature and 100% nurture.’168  Once this is 
acknowledged we can explore the way in which the natural or the biological interacts, 
transforms and becomes in continuation with the cultural.  
 
‘Becoming’ 
The insight that we are 100% nature and 100% culture refigures ourselves as bio-
cultural creatures, immersed in and interactive with both biological and cultural forces 
acting together. Sexed embodiment rethought this way - rather than through a binary 
framework - challenges the view that there is a natural and precultural essence of the 
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body that can be uncovered by science. Contrary to scientific understandings of sex, 
there is no such thing as pure biology. Sex, like gender, is constructed. Butler has 
shown, for example, how the concept of gender produces sex.169 That is, the act of 
seeing only two ways of performing gender produces two biological sexes. The binary 
sexes are not static and essential entities but rather bodies transform and become in 
continuation with the cultural. Bodies are an open-ended and complex system, they 
are: 
 
  ‘discontinuous, nontotalized series of processes, organs, flows, energies, 
corporeal substances and incorporeal events, intensities, and durations.’170   
 
Bodies thought this way mean that we are now dealing with a subject that is never 
mired in being but is always in the process of becoming something else. A 
determinative truth to sexed embodiment, therefore, cannot be uncovered. This is 
impossible given that the body is constantly changing by virtue of the forces and 
processes taking place in and around it. The body, then, can better be thought of as a 
multitude of processes and forces that change over time. It is not a closed and 
contained organism; it exists as an open-ended system that is affected and produced 
by many different contingencies in unpredictable ways.  It follows that under this 
conceptualisation of embodiment, gendered ‘becomings’ cannot be foreseen nor 
contained, but should instead be understood as an open and abundant terrain 
constituted by a multiplicity of active forces. An understanding of sex and gender that 
underpin the features of the GRA contrasts to how these phenomena are understood 
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in terms of ‘becoming’. The GRA depends on the essentialist construction of sex and 
the strict demarcation of sex and gender to recognise only two binary genders. The 
essentialist construction of sex has allowed the GRA to set the limits on what will 
qualify as a body by regulating the terms by which bodies are and are not 
recognizable. Certain factors have been foreclosed or banished from the proper 
domain of sex - and some have been included to create the binary rule of sex 
difference. However, gender thought in terms of ‘becoming’, gender as a multiplicity 
creates a new rule for sex difference. Under this rule, gender categories are not strictly 
demarcated but are instead thought of as open and permeable, the boundaries fluid 
and shifting. The difference amongst these multiple categories will be thought of as 
‘shades of difference’171 rather than as clear opposites as they are under the current 
binary rule. Moreover, gender transitions will no longer be thought of as merely a 
movement across the binary or movement across numerous boundaries between 
multiple identity categories. Rather, gender transitions will be fluid and imperceptible, 
not clear cut: 
 
 ‘identity is motion, fluidity dissolves boundaries and carries them off in its 
flood.’172 
 
Thinking gender as ‘becoming’, as dynamic movement, undermines both the 
normative construction of bounded categories and the identities that emerge from this 
construction. ‘Becoming’ moves our thinking beyond the binary sexes. It dismantles 
the sex/gender system in law that is currently constrained by the binary and offers a 
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radical re-figuration of the body which is in the constant and unpredictable process of 
change. As we will now see, this does not merely push the body beyond the two sexes, 
‘becoming’ refigures the body so that a closed conception of identity is impossible.  
 
‘Becoming’ refigures the body as a multitude of processes and forces that change over 
time. Not only does ‘becoming’ re-organise the concepts of sex and gender and how 
they affect the body, it also recognises the body as being affected by the force of time. 
Against the notion that the body is spatially indifferent and temporally static, 
‘becoming’ situates the body in temporal frames, insisting that we conceive of the 
body as a collection of processes of elaboration and change, both within individual 
organisms and across generations. No longer inert and ahistorical,  the body refigured 
in terms of ‘becoming’  allows for the incorporation of temporal dimensions into 
trans* embodiment. The temporal complexity of trans* embodiment must now be 
investigated. Whilst all bodies become in temporally complex ways, we will see that 
trans* temporalities are particularly salient because they undermine the universality 
of ‘chrononormativity’. Drawing critical attention to the temporal underpinnings of 
law, and how they contrast with trans* temporalities, might open toward a more 
transformative model of recognition.  
 
Time 
The new conception of the body as an open-ended system not only challenges the 
sex/gender system but it also disrupts the fallacy that the body is ahistorical, 
unaffected by time. Subjects do not act on empty time. In other words, not only are 
natural and cultural forces acting within and around the body but time is also an active 
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ingredient in its constitution.173. ‘Becoming’ challenges us to recognise the body as a 
system that is radically open to nonlinear temporal forces of sensation. Recognising 
the complexity of time as an active force in ‘becoming’ is important. The relationship 
between law and time should be considered if we are to understand the way in which 
we are alive.  
 
Law produces and regulates gender identities not only through particular 
constructions of sex and gender, but also through temporal mechanisms. The construct 
of time produces particular types of embodied trans* legal subject with ‘particular 
histories, trajectories and futures.’ 174 Time is not objective, nor is it an extraneous 
entity. The widely held assumption that subjects take part in, and act upon, ‘empty 
time’ is false. Time is not a neutral or transparent medium from which subjects 
emerge. Rather, human practice makes time.175 The reality that time is a construct is 
a disorientating concept. Much like sex difference, time has been considered to be one 
of the few seemingly reliable and objective things in life. One explanation given to 
this is that because we ‘experience time as some form of natural progression’, we ‘fail 
to realize or notice its construction.’176 Significantly, not only is time constructed, the 
way in which it is constructed in law privileges certain ways of life and prohibits 
others. Forms of temporal experience only seem natural, liveable and doable to those 
they privilege. Trans* lives are not simply at odds with the normative gender binary 
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but are also at odds with normative conceptions of time. 177 For trans* people - who 
resist normative temporalities - their lives appear to be completely ‘out of time’. Law 
tries to contain and regulate the queer temporalities of trans* lives through temporal 
mechanisms that are underpinned by normative constructions of time.  
 
I will demonstrate that the GRA operates from particular constructions of time. As 
will be explored further below, the current conceptions of time embedded in the law 
fails to reflect the lives of many trans* people. The reason for this is that trans* lives 
fall completely outside the acceptable temporal schemes that law proscribes. Within 
the GRA there are temporal mechanisms which are based on particular linear, 
coherent and predictable temporalities whereas trans* lives spans often follow 
nonlinear, unclear and unforeseeable life trajectories. The term ‘chrononormativity’ 
has been used to describe the way in which bodies are shaped and organized by 
time.178 Bodies are linked, or bound, to normative temporal frames or ‘narratives of 
movement and change.’179 Chrononormativity thus assumes that there is a pre-
determined way to live your life, with particular normative schedules shaping and 
limiting what ways are possible. There are many common temporal frames, including: 
the path to marriage, the accumulation of health and wealth for the future, 
reproduction, and childrearing. Notably, these narratives all follow ‘straight’ 
conceptions of time. Straight is used here in two senses of the word: it refers to the 
reproductive and heteronormative familial and also to the linear and unidirectional. 
                                                
177	ibid	at	p.7	
178	E.	Freeman,		Time	Binds:	Queer	Temporalities,	Queer	Histories.	Halberstam,	J	
and	Lisa,	Lowe	(eds)	(USA:	Duke	University	Press,	2010)	
179	ibid	at	p.4	
	 87	
Trans* subjectivities occur outside the parameters of straight time. Halberstam, for 
example, observes that trans* people problematize the  
 
‘the conventional forward moving narratives of birth, marriage, reproduction 
and death.’ 180 
 
Rather than giving space to these aberrations, law’s response is to attempt to bind 
these queer deviations to normative temporal schedules.  The GRA uses three 
temporal mechanisms to bind bodies to straight temporal frames: the gender dysphoria 
requirement, the two-year requirement and the gender permanence provision. 
Through these, it will be shown, law is able to ‘shape and determine the possibilities, 
hopes, and future-scapes of transgendered people.’181 Again, the rationale here is 
clear: law is functioning to restrict and produce permissible narratives to ones that 
follow straight conceptions of time and that are within the gender binary.    
 
Gender Dysphoria 
The gender dysphoria requirement is one of three provisions in the GRA that 
illustrates that access to recognition, and therefore what trans* lives are possible, is 
controlled through temporal regulations. While the gender dysphoria provision is 
found in section 2 (1) (a) of the Act, the provision itself contains no definition of the 
condition. However, the NHS website describes gender dysphoria as follows:  
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‘In most cases, this type of behavior is just part of growing up and will pass in 
time, but for those with gender dysphoria it continues through childhood and into 
adulthood.’182 
 
The definition of gender dysphoria on the NHS website prescribes a specific 
temporality for trans* folk to follow and comes in the form of narrative. For trans* 
people to be recognised as having or having had gender dysphoria, their experience 
of it must follow the narrative laid out above. The phrase ‘Childhood into adulthood’ 
describes the ‘maturity narrative’ which has been discussed and critiqued by 
Halberstam.183 This maturity narrative follows the linear ‘emergence of the adult from 
the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation.’184 
Implicit in this narrative is the understanding that anything experienced prior to the 
emergence of ‘adulthood’ is immature, ‘a phase’ or inauthentic; it is only anything 
experienced after this transitional period that is considered to be genuine and final. 
The similarities with how same-sex desire has been perceived at different life stages 
are obvious. Homosexuality, too, has been theorized ‘as a stage in development, a 
phase, that the adolescent will hopefully pass through quickly and painlessly.’185 In 
the same way that same-sex desire is presumed to be a stage or a phase, cross gender 
identification or ambiguousness is also expected (and hoped) to be a temporary life 
stage rather than a lifelong commitment. Moreover, the definition also suggests that 
there are limitations on what feelings will be taken seriously even if felt in adulthood. 
‘Continues through’ suggests that only feelings of dysphoria that have persisted for a 
                                                
182	NHS,	Gender	Dysphoria,	2016	<	https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/gender-
dysphoria/	>	[accessed	10	January	2018]	
183	J.	Halberstam,	In	a	Queer	time	and	Place	,	2005	at	p.4	
184	ibid	
185	ibid	at	p.174	
	 89	
long time i.e. since childhood and through the transition into adulthood are to be 
validated. It is suggested that folk that begin to feel gender dysphoria at later stages 
in life may find it more difficult to convince others of the authenticity of their desires. 
This illuminates what Borneman has shown in his exploration of how personal 
histories are not legible unless they exist within a ‘state-sponsored time-line.’186 This 
provision of the GRA works to ensure that a legible life is only that which adheres to 
straight time. That is, life trajectories that follow the stable and linear transition of 
adulthood into childhood, that is underpinned by a heteronormative/reproductive 
temporal logic, will be privileged. The difficulty, however, is that many trans* 
narratives involve different temporal experiences of gender: 
 
‘As we listen to trans* stories, autobiographies, poems, prose and narratives 
outside the clinic we notice that they are irreducible to the presupposed chronological 
progression from a ‘terrible-present-in-the-wrong-body’ to a ‘better-future-in-the-
right-body.’ Trans* lives are more complicated and nuanced than this temporal 
sequence indicates.’187 
 
If one wants to gain recognition one must mould and alter the accounts of their desires 
so that they are coherent to law.  This requires the trans* subject to flatten out their 
past experiences into one, true authentic and persistent desire, and a future removed 
of any regrets.  Inconsistencies with an unfaltering and stable desire to be the opposite 
sex will likely result in a diagnosis not being given. James Morton from the Scottish 
Transgender Alliance, for example, has reported that:  
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‘Panels have been incredibly pedantic about any perceived inconsistencies in 
the medical reports, which means that people end up extremely upset and feel really 
invalidated.’ 188 
 
A concern with inconsistency ignores the reality of the instability and unpredictably 
of gender ‘becomings’. The focus of the law on a coherent narrative precludes the 
idiosyncratic nature of transition journeys. Dean Spade’s narrative, which intertwines 
his gender desires with his political and intellectual inclinations, for example, would 
surely not grant him access to the GRA: 
‘My project would be to promote sex reassignment, gender alteration, 
temporary gender adventure, and mutilation of gender categories, via surgery, 
hormones, clothing, political lobbying, civil disobedience, or any other means 
available. But that political commitment itself, if revealed to the gatekeepers of my 
surgery disqualifies me. One therapist said to me, “you’re really intellectualizing this, 
we need to get to the root of why you feel you should get your breasts removed, how 
long have you felt this way?”189 
 
Spade’s description of his therapist’s reaction to his narrative shows that gatekeepers 
often look for one story and consistency in the gender narrative. Anything else is 
disregarded or met with suspicion. The power of law acts to ensure that the GRP 
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favours those accounts that are in line with law’s narratives of what it means to be 
trans* and any accounts that diverge are treated as ‘suspect or secondary.’190 The 
gender dysphoria requirement, like the gatekeeper in Spade’s account, focuses on the 
length and durability of the desire and ignores the multitude of other factors involved 
in someone’s sense of self. Spade rightfully critiques this focus, challenging: ‘Does 
realness reside in the length of time a desire exists?’ 191 
 
There are many different temporal trajectories of trans* experiences of gender 
dysphoria and of gender itself. For some, the feeling of distress in the gender they 
were assigned to at birth is not as persistent or as intense as the diagnosis postulates. 
And for many, the extreme discomfort did not begin in early childhood. Many trans* 
folk experience their gender in a non-linear and incoherent time frame that is out of 
alignment with what the diagnosis is asking for. The diagnosis and therefore the GRA, 
ignores these alternative narratives with the hope that it will function to force trans* 
people to alter their experiences so that they coalesce into one easily manageable 
identity group. This illustrates that temporal governance play a part in the regulation 
and production of trans* lives.   
 
Two year  requirement  
Section (2) (1) (b) of the GRA contains yet another provision that forces trans* folk 
into regulated durations of gender performance and stability. This section requires that 
for recognition to be granted, that the applicant: 
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‘has lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years ending 
with the date on which the application is made.’ 
 
It is clear that this requirement is regulating the public life of trans* lives. This 
provision is often referred to as the ‘real life test’: during this time the applicant must 
live their life in a way that is associated with the gender they feel themselves to be.  
The success of the achievement of this requirement by the applicant will be 
determined by the GRP who will examine evidence showing that the applicant has 
presented themselves in a way that correlates with their chosen gender. This provision 
has been critiqued due to its subjective nature. Jeffreys, for example, has noted that 
the members of the GRP are people who undoubtedly and inescapably possess their 
own biases and perceptions of what is the correct aesthetic and behavior associated 
with male and female genders.192 The requirement therefore clearly regulates trans* 
subjectivity through aesthetic judgements, or what Sandland calls the ‘public politics 
of the presentational.’193 In addition to this, and most important for our purposes, the 
requirement also signals a regulation of the subject through time. Contained in section 
(c) is a time period in which the applicant must ‘live’ as the gender they wish to 
acquire before their application is considered. Grabham has demonstrated that law, 
through this temporal mechanism, is attempting to shape trans* agents’ ‘experiences 
of their own bodies, and their experience of the “forthcoming”’194 During this time 
trans* folk must perform gender stability. Any shifts or changes felt in their gender 
identity during this time must be ignored, doused or blocked if they want to achieve 
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the required stability for recognition. For example, Sandland has argued that an FtM 
transsexual who engages in sexual activity as a female during this time may be denied 
recognition.195 While this period is a time which is potentially full of hope and 
anticipation, for many it also brings with it the fear of not being ‘trans* enough’. 
During this time there is the ongoing fear that one is not living one’s gendered life in 
a way that is associated with a man or associated with a woman to such an extent that 
it is deserving of recognition. This temporal framework compels subjects to live in 
one of two genders, and acts to freeze their gender ‘becomings’, eliding the 
complexity and ambiguity of people’s gendered selves and curtailing their freedom 
and autonomy.  
 
Gender Permanence  
The gender dysphoria and two year provisions of the Act regulate trans* subjectivities 
by requiring gender stability. Both provisions require the trans* subject to perform 
gender in a particular way: they must experience a gender that is different from that 
assigned to them at birth persistently and that lasts from childhood through to 
adulthood and they must have lived as that acquired gender for at least a period of two 
years. If the applicant’s current and previous gendered self does not align with these 
temporal frames proscribed by law, recognition is denied. The gender permanence 
provision in section 2 (1) (c) of the GRA also functions to regulate trans* lives through 
temporal mechanism. Whilst the temporal regulation of gender dysphoria and the two 
year requirement provisions look to the past and current gender embodiments of the 
applicant, the temporal regulation of the gender permanence requirement comes in the 
form of a declaration of future intention. This provision requires trans* folk to declare 
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that they intend to maintain their gender identification ‘until death’196. It is through 
this promise, undertaken in the present, that the trans* legal subject’s whole future 
becomes decided and contained. Grabham has argued that this requirement is not 
simply there to ensure certainty given that it ‘goes well beyond any administrative 
rationale of assisting in the identification of post-recognition trans* citizens.’197 
Rather, it is argued, it is there to secure gender permanence. The for life requirement 
acts as guarantee to law, from the trans* applicant, that throughout the rest of their 
lives they will adhere to gender normativity and the gender binary that underpins it. 
Those that are willing and able to make this undertaking gain access to recognition 
and those who do not consider legal recognition as marking the end of one’s gender 
journey are denied it. The GRA is demonstrating that law will permit gender 
transitions from female to male or male to female provided that they are ‘final’ and 
‘irreversible.’198 The new is only allowed if it is recognizable and tied to the known. 
Faced with the gender flexibility of trans* people, law’s response is to allow gender 
crossings, but in a regulated way that reinforces the binary divide by ‘simply effecting 
a changing of places which leaves the lines of demarcation relatively uncontested.’199 
In other words, law will allow change, or ‘the new’, but only if it is able to be 
predicted, anticipated and incorporated within the already existing frameworks. As 
Grabham correctly points out, this is ‘evidence of how critical concepts of gender can 
be refracted into more normative outcomes through engagement with law reform.’ 200  
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In addition, the permanence requirement acts to ensure that the gender transition 
process takes place at a clearly definable time and has a clear and specific end-point. 
The current model of recognition for trans* people is imagined as a ‘specific moment 
fixed in space and time when acknowledgement is bestowed upon the individual.’201 
This ‘poses the act of claiming recognition as a monumental, one-off event.’202  
Transitions are much more complex than how this provision poses it. Transition is not 
a one-off event. In addition to genital surgery or attainment of a GRC, transition is 
also, as Simpkins points out, a bundle of different type of changes:  
 
‘everyday concatenations (tuckings, pullings, bindings, wrappings, prickings, 
gesturings, speakings, clothings, paddings, strappings, comportings, bearings, 
lookings, posturings, assertings, spacings, affectings, insertings, thrustings, givings, 
moldings, shapings, framings).’203 
 
This series of changes can begin long before approaching the law and often continue 
long after recognition. This highlights the complexity of trans* embodiment which is 
in contrast to the way the GRA imagines it. Trans* lives are more complicated and 
nuanced than what the temporal schedules of law suggest.  A recognition model like 
the GRA freezes and blocks any future gender ‘becomings’ and ignores the plethora 
of ways and stages of transition. Grabham observes that ‘it is a gender fixing’; it 
requires trans* citizens to perform and produce gender permanence in a certain way. 
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This requirement is at odds with the view taken by many trans* individuals who view 
their gender as a process of ‘becoming’; as fluid, irredeemably incomplete and beyond 
the binary. Impermanence, fluidity and future unpredictability is unrecognisable 
under the current provisions of the GRA. While some trans* folk undoubtedly live 
with a sense of certainty and permanence and are therefore well served by the GRA, 
many do not. 204 
While the it is true that recognition provides rights and a significant degree of 
protection, this comes at the cost of requiring many trans* folk to give up their 
specificity and any possibility of gender change, evolution or ‘becoming’ post 
recognition.   
 
Grabham has demonstrated that individuals orient themselves in relation to what the 
law lays out, rather than authoring their experience for themselves. Much ‘like that of 
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a jumper preparing to jump,’205 trans* people’s actions and desires are molded and 
altered in anticipation of the forthcoming. This ‘orientation to future action’206 
changes trans* folk’s experience of becoming trans*. Trans* people gendered 
‘becomings’ are compelled towards identities that are in alignment with the 
regulations of the GRA. Lives that experience gender non-conformity coalesce and 
follow a single predetermined path rather than experiencing their own unique and 
unpredictable journey. In this sense, the GRA acts to contain folk’s future gender 
‘becomings’ and diminishes the potential variability and richness of trans* 
subjectivity.207  Along with the gender dysphoria diagnosis and the two year 
requirement, the gender permanence provision is further indication that law believes 
that gendered lives should follow a clear, coherent and pre-determined path. Trans* 
subjects must orient themselves in relation to the regulations of the GRA if they are 
to have access to recognition. This orientation can often begin long before direct 
interaction with the law. The provisions ‘require the modification of one’s relation to 
all future gendered action within the life- span’208. It therefore affects trans* people 
long before they interact with the law. The permanence provision, ‘obfuscates the 
lived futurity, and/or becoming, of post-recognition trans* subjects.’209  
 
The effect of ‘becoming’ on the GRA  
The effects of the above temporal mechanisms within the act highlight the normative 
underpinnings of the GRA, this time from a temporal perspective. It is clear that the 
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Act privileges gender that is stable, develops in a coherent and linear fashion and is 
binary.  ‘Becoming’, however, allows us to reimagine the normative underpinnings of 
the GRA so that a closed conception of gendered identity is impossible. A ‘becoming’ 
conception of gender elides any notion of required permanency and stability and better 
reflects the reality that people’s gendered lives continue to change and develop over 
time, even after events such as surgery, HRT or attainment of a GRC. ‘Becoming’ 
offers a conception of time, as well as a conception of sex and gender, that is 
compatible with the variability, fluidity and unpredictability of trans* lives. This new 
conception of time does not follow any logic but is instead open to the unpredictability 
of the future.  I will use the phrase ‘becoming’ temporalities to denote this new 
conception. ‘Becoming’ temporalities ‘challenge conventional logics of development, 
maturity, adulthood and responsibility.’210 In contrast to the dominant temporal 
frames under chrononormativity, ‘becoming’ time is not concerned with reproduction, 
family, longevity or the childhood into adulthood narrative in traditional and 
normative ways.  ‘Becoming’ temporalities are temporalities that resist, instead of 
follow, the chronology of progress. In fact, ‘becoming’ time rejects any form of pre-
set narrative. It recognises that people’s lives are not a matter of ‘unfolding an already 
worked out blueprint.’211 A determinative narrative is declined in favour of a time that 
is ‘outside the causal control that the past exerts over the present and the future.’212 
Queer time is elaboration. It is ‘indeterminate, the unfolding and the emergence of the 
new.’213 The future is not contained by present but is considered to be full of 
unpredictable potentiality.  
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A recognition model that incorporates these complex and nuanced temporal frames 
into its framework must leave behind any mechanisms that seek to control or force 
people into normative sex/gender classification and life schedules. The gender binary 
logic, the gender dysphoria requirement, the two-year requirement provisions and the 
gender permanence provisions must be eliminated so that a more fluid and spacious 
path for recognition in law can be offered. Recognition law thought this way will not 
figure trans* lives as something that are in need of management, constrain and 
regulation. Difference will not be assimilated into prevailing norms but instead 
recognised and celebrated in all its specificity as a normal variation of human 
becoming.  
 
Conclusion 
Chapter two has explored the concept of ‘becoming’ and demonstrated how it 
challenges the provisions which maintain and regulate the idea of authentic trans* 
identity which the GRA is currently based on. Whilst the GRA allows trans* people 
to be recognised formally, it does so in a way that elides much of the richness and 
ambiguity of their lives. ‘Becoming’, with its focus in imperceptibility and 
unpredictability, allows for the claim of authenticity to be disconnected from 
recognition so that fluid, ambiguous and beyond the binary subject positions may be 
taken up and recognised in law. ‘Becoming’ changes how we think of sexual 
difference. Difference is now thought of as pure difference, as that which constitutes 
all living matter and therefore is uncontained by the male/female binary. Moreover, 
‘becoming’ involves the refiguration of the body that is imbued with a temporal 
complexity. The normative sex/gender framework of the GRA and its normative 
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temporal underpinnings must be dismantled so that recognition is compatible with the 
‘becoming’ temporalities of trans* lives. A recognition model based on this 
refiguration will now be explored in more detail. Instead of attempting to bind queer 
temporal deviations to normative temporal schedules, and queer sexual identity to 
normative sex/gender classifications, a fluid and transformative recognition model is 
offered. Recognition need not be tied to any given authentic identity and it need not 
be given solely to those with a clear cut and recognizable gender history – but also to 
those whose gender identifications are in the process of being formed or changing.  
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Chapter Three 
Trans* Recognition: Potential Ways Forward  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The GRA, it has been argued, gives far too much respect to upholding the gender 
binary at the expense of granting trans* people the freedom to determine the course 
of their gendered lives. The rationale behind the GRA – respect for the gender binary- 
is unprincipled for two main reasons. Firstly, there is evidence that trans* people 
suffer greatly as a direct result of the terms of the GRA. This was explored in Chapter 
one. Secondly, both the queer advancements in the theorizing of sex and the concept 
of ‘becoming’ illuminate that the gender binary is not an objective fact. This was 
explored in Chapter two. Organizing bodies according to the binary logic is therefore 
unprincipled. Chapter three introduces a new model of recognition that is firstly, 
responsive to the new ways of understanding embodiment in terms of ‘becoming’ and 
secondly, goes some way towards remedying the problems with the current model. 
The new model, it will be argued, better respects trans* person’s freedom and 
autonomy which ought to be the objective of gender recognition law. In addition to 
this principle, other objectives should include the promotion of true equality between 
cis and trans* people and the ability of law to protect of trans* people from 
discrimination. Finally, reserved too must be the ability of law to allow trans* people 
to access trans* specific healthcare. This chapter will show that the new model 
proposed can achieve all these aims.  
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Not trans* enough 
Chapter one showed that the current legal regime for gender recognition gives too 
much concern toward protecting the gender binary, at the expense of trans* person’s 
freedom and autonomy. The result is that trans* people are depicted in the Act as a 
monolithic, homogenous and pathological group, positioned as anomalies or 
exceptions to the gender binary. Moreover, the ideal of authenticity required by the 
Act- and the difficulties and pressure to accomplish it – causes significant distress for 
trans* people. Not only must those that do not or cannot live up to the standard go 
without the material benefits of a GRC, they also suffer psychologically. The 
psychological suffering that comes with grounding recognition law in a restrictive 
definition of what it means to be trans* is illuminated by the myriad of trans* 
narratives and stories that speak of feelings or accusations of ‘not being trans 
enough.’214 For example, Sam Dylan Finch who is a writer in the trans* community, 
has stated that many within the trans* community do not believe that he is trans*: 
 
 ‘by far, the biggest pushback I receive is the accusation that I’m not trans* 
enough.’215 
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Finch has explained that their feelings of inauthenticity come from the restrictive and 
uncompromising account of what it means to be trans* that exists both within and 
outside of trans* circles: 
 
‘if my narrative fails to be typical in any way – I didn’t always know, I’m not 
dysphoric enough, I haven’t had enough medical interventions, I’m too feminine, I’m 
not happy enough with my transition (yes, seriously) – I’m ostracized by folks both 
within and outside of the community.’216 
 
Lack of gender stability (a stability that the GRA requires across its provisions) is 
used as ammunition by others in refusing to affirm trans* people’s self-identified 
gender and acts to foster feelings of insecurity within trans* people themselves. A 
recent study on the experiences of non-binary people in the UK found that a number 
of respondents experienced feelings of not being trans* enough.217 A lack of persistent 
dysphoria, gender stability and the fact they still live publicly in their assigned gender 
were cited as reasons for these feelings.  218 It is fair to say that the legal recognition 
of trans* people – which requires persistent dysphoria, a two year life test and stable 
binary gender - influences these feelings of not being trans* enough in the community. 
A respondent in recent research by the LGBT charity Stonewall, for example, 
described how interaction with the GRA made them feel inauthentic: 
                                                
216	ibid	
217	In	the	survey	on	non-binary	people	in	the	UK,	20%	answered	‘unsure’	and	15%	
answered	‘no’	to	the	question	“do	you	consider	yourself	to	be	trans*?”	9%	of	this	
group	said	they	answered	this	way	because	they	felt	that	they	weren’t	“trans	
enough”.	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	UK.	(2016),	17	<	
https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Report-final.pdf>	
[accessed	12	September	2018]	
218	Ibid.		
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‘The Gender Recognition Act allowed me to change my birth certificate, 
however, the process to do so felt invasive and judged me for not being "trans 
enough."’219 
 
Recognition law is central in the construction and regulation of trans* identity. Trans* 
folk do not act independently from law. Rather, what law considers possible as 
recognizable influences trans* subjects to a large extent. The GRA, backed by the 
power of law, plays a crucial role in asserting how things are by imposing its meaning 
of events on everyday life. Chapter one showed how the official field of knowledge 
of law, and the superiority it claims to have, ensures that any alternative or competing 
narratives of what it means to be trans* are dismissed, doubted or, as Smart puts it, 
considered ‘suspect and/or secondary.’220 In other words, law uses its power and 
influence to delimit the kinds of gendered lives possible by ignoring and invalidating 
the alternative versions that live outside its strict and uncompromising definitions. 
Law seeps into trans* existence and the development of trans* identities. As such the 
law not only ensures that those whose gender identities differ from the norm are 
protected through legislation such as the GRA and the Equality Act, the law also 
constructs the boundaries of those identities.  
 
From binary bodies to ‘becoming’ bodies.  
                                                
219	Isaac,	24	(West	Midlands)	in	C.L	Bachmann	&	B.	Gooch.	LGBT	in	Britain:	Trans	
Report	(2018),	21	<	https://www.stonewall.org.uk/sites/default/files/lgbt-in-
britain-trans.pdf>		[accessed	12	September	2018]	
220	C.	Smart,	Feminism	and	the	Power	of	Law.	(Routledge,	London,	1989)	p.11	
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It has already been discussed that those who choose to engage with the GRA must 
align themselves with its terms and are therefore regulated and controlled by law. 
Significantly however, the legal category of trans* regulates not only those whose 
choose to approach the law. Whilst direct interaction with the GRA can certainly 
change the experience of being trans*, the influence of law can also manipulate those 
who keep their distance. Chapter two introduced the concept of ‘becoming’ and also 
demonstrated that individuals begin to orient themselves towards what the law lays 
out, rather than defining the experience for themselves. The GRA, in this sense, acts 
to contain folk’s future gender becomings. In other words, trans* subject’s sense of 
the forthcoming shapes and regulates who and what they allow themselves to become. 
Gender expressions that have not yet been realized might never come to fruition. The 
Act ignores the plethora of ways to be trans*, current and potential, and chooses 
instead to map-out a template of trans* identity which is stable and authentic. The 
terms of the GRA, so narrow and uncompromising, leave no room for the fluid, 
unstable, non-binary and incomplete identities that ‘becoming’ opens our eyes to and 
that an increasing number of people are now identifying with. 221 Chapter two ended 
                                                
221	A	number	of	recent	surveys	have	found	that	the	non-binary	trans*	population	is	
significant.	The	national	LGBT	Survey,	published	in	2018,	had	over	108,000	
respondents.	Of	the	total	sample,	7%	identified	as	non-binary.	Amongst	trans*	
respondents,	over	half	(52%)	identified	as	non-binary.	Government	Equalities	
Office,	National	LGBT	Survey:	Research	Report	,	(July	2018),	16	<	
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/721704/LGBT-survey-research-report.pdf>	[accessed	12	
September	2018];		
A	2016	survey	asking	for	people’s	experiences	of	being	non-binary	attracted	895	
responses	from	self-identified	non-binary	people.	In	this	survey,	over	half	(54%)	
described	their	gender	as	fluid.	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	
UK.	(2016),	13	<	https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Report-final.pdf>	[accessed	12	September	2018].	In	a	
recent	survey	by	Stonewall	UK,	just	under	half	(48%)	of	respondents	describe	their	
gender	in	a	different	way	from	male	or	female.	See	C.L	Bachmann	&	B.	Gooch.	
LGBT	in	Britain:	Trans	Report	(2018),	23	<	
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with the suggestion that the concept of ‘becoming’ can help us move away from 
thinking identity in terms of the gender binary and authenticity/non-authenticity and 
therefore alter recognition law, that has up until now been based on this framework. 
A ‘becoming’ self is fluid, contingent and has a future uncontained by the present. 
Legal suggestions will now be offered that are compatible with this ‘becoming’ self 
and that better perform the desirable functions of law stated throughout this thesis.  
 
New Functions of Law 
It has been submitted that the legal regime for gender recognition currently concerns 
itself too much with protecting the gender binary, at the expense of respecting trans* 
person’s freedom and autonomy. The result is that trans* people are depicted as a 
monolithic, homologous and pathological group. The effects of grounding recognition 
law in this definition, as well as material legal and administrative effects, are that it 
contributes to the lack of acceptance and understanding that trans* people face in their 
day to day lives, as well as feelings of low self-esteem. A less restrictive and 
burdensome legal recognition model can improve this situation. Evidence shows that 
trans* people consider legal recognition to be crucial in improving the quality of their 
lives. In a survey on non-binary identities, a number of respondents spoke about how 
much they value legal recognition:  
 
                                                
https://www.stonewall.org.uk/sites/default/files/lgbt-in-britain-trans.pdf>		
[accessed	12	September	2018]	
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 ‘Legal Recognition at least makes it possible for people like me to be part of 
society, to not be on the outside. It is also the best step forwards towards more social 
acceptance and integration of non-binary identities.’222 
 
Legal recognition for trans* people, particularly when it has been denied to them for 
so long, is a high priority on the list of things that could improve their lives. This 
chapter will now explore a model of recognition that responds to identity thought of 
in terms of ‘becoming’ and that better respects trans* person’s freedom and autonomy, 
allows them continued access to rights and protections and situates them alongside 
cisgender identities. It is submitted that a legal regime of gender recognition that 
allows for self-declaration and that recognizes multiple genders achieves these aims. 
A self-declaration model will de-territorialize trans* identity: it will acknowledge the 
body’s ability to shift and transition among genders ‘without external prompts and 
approval.’223 This means that trans* people will no longer face interference by the 
state in how they choose to live their gendered life. Moreover, the availability of a 
large number of multiple gender categories allows for more types of trans* lives to be 
acknowledged in their specificity and ambiguity, particularly fluid identities and those 
identities that are beyond the binary. This means that trans* people will no longer 
have to force themselves into categories in order to gain rights. These two components 
of the new model, taken together, will function to give trans* people more respect and 
autonomy, situate them alongside cis identities while keeping the rights and 
protections they currently have access to.  
                                                
222	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	UK.	(2016),	79	<	
https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Report-final.pdf>	
[accessed	12	September	2018].		
223	J.	Veccaro.	‘Felt	Matters’	in	Transgender	Studies	Reader	2	S	Stryker,		and	A	
Aizura	(eds)	(Routledge	2013)	p.96	
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Self-Identification 
It is proposed that law should permit individuals to self-identify their own gender for 
legal purposes without requiring medical certification or a guarantee that their gender 
identity will remain stable throughout their life. Self-declaration is widely recognized 
as being international best practice. It has now been adopted in a number of countries, 
including: Norway, Denmark, Malta, Columbia, Argentina, and the Republic of 
Ireland.224 Certain Canadian and America states, like Quebec and Oregon, have also 
moved this way.225 Reforming Scotland’s gender recognition law to incorporate a self-
identification model would therefore bring Scotland in line with international best 
practice. This would also be in line with Transgender Europe’s call for the 
development of ‘quick’ and ‘transparent’ gender recognition procedures.226 A self-
declaration model is supported by international human rights framework: both the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)227 and the Yogyakarta Principles 
                                                
224	Scottish	Government,	Review	of	the	gender	recognition	Act	2004:	A	
Consultation,	(2017),	3.21	https://consult.gov.scot/family-law/review-of-the-
gender-recognition-act-2004/user_uploads/sct1017251758-1_gender_p4--3-.pdf	
[accessed	12	September	2018].		
225	Minister	for	Women	and	Equalities,	Reform	of	the	Recognition	Act	–	
Government	Consultation.	(2018),	para.42.	
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/721725/GRA-Consultation-document.pdf	[accessed	12	
September	2018].	
226	Resolution	2048	of	the	Parliamentary	Assembly	of	the	Council	of	Europe	
resolution	calls	on	all	Member	States	to	“develop	quick,	transparent	and	accessible	
procedures,	based	on	self-determination,	for	changing	the	name	and	registered	sex	
of	transgender	people	on	birth	certificates,	identity	cards…and	other	similar	
documents.	Parliamentary	Assembly	of	the	Council	of	Europe,	Resolution	2048	
(2015)	‘Discrimination	against	Transgender	People	in	Europe’,	2015.	accessible	at:	
http://tinyurl.com/hx9nzzz	[accessed	12	September	2018]	
227	In	2015,	Resolution	2048	of	the	Parliamentary	Assembly	of	the	Council	of	
Europe	(Resolution	2048)	expressed	concerns	that	requiring	someone	seeking	legal	
recognition	of	their	acquired	gender	to	have	been	medically	treated	or	diagnosed	is	
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advocate it.228 Finally, a recent consultation on the current GRA in Scotland proposed 
that recognition law be amended to include a self-identification system. 229 
 
Although specifics of the model vary from country to country,230 generally speaking, 
this type of model focusses exclusively on trans* person’s felt sense of gender. In 
contrast to the medicalized, quasi-judicial process of the GRA, it is more akin to an 
administrative process. The focus is on the wishes of the applicant, as opposed to 
relying on intensive analysis by doctors and lawyers. This type of model would 
therefore decrease the ‘intrusive and humiliating’ aspects of the GRA in its current 
                                                
a	breach	of	their	right	to	respect	for	their	private	life	under	Article	8	of	the	ECHR.	
The	resolution	calls	on	all	Member	States	to:	
“develop	quick,	transparent	and	accessible	procedures,	based	on	self-
determination,	for	changing	the	name	and	registered	sex	of	transgender	people	on	
birth	certificates,	identity	cards	…	and	other	similar	documents”.		Accessed	at	
<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fileid=21736&lang=en.>	[accessed	12	September	2018].	
228	In	2006,	a	group	of	human	rights	law	experts,	representatives	of	
nongovernmental	organisations	and	others	agreed	the	non-binding	Yogyakarta	
Principles.	Principle	31	asks	countries	to:	“take	all	necessary	…	measures	to	ensure	
that	procedures	exist	whereby	all	State-issued	identity	papers	which	indicate	a	
person’s	gender/sex	including	birth	certificates	…	reflect	the	person’s	profound	
self-defined	gender	identity”	and	to	“ensure	that	such	procedures	are	efficient,	fair	
and	non-discriminatory,	and	respect	the	dignity	and	privacy	of	the	person	
concerned”.	Principle	31	of		Yogyakarta	Principles,	2017	accessible	at	
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org	[accessed	12	September	2018]	
229	Scottish	Government,	Review	of	the	gender	recognition	Act	2004:	A	
Consultation,	(2017),	3.26	https://consult.gov.scot/family-law/review-of-the-
gender-recognition-act-2004/user_uploads/sct1017251758-1_gender_p4--3-.pdf	
[accessed	12	September	2018].	
230	For	an	overview	of	how	the	model	works	in	each	country,	see	Scottish	
Government,	Review	of	the	gender	recognition	Act	2004:	A	Consultation,	2017	at	
2.1	-	5.4.	
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form as well as being less time consuming and costly, issues that were recently 
highlighted by the Scottish Government231 and the Women Equalities Committee.232  
 
Although this proposal is similar in many ways to that suggested by the Scottish 
Government’s recent review of the GRA, it diverges in one important way. The recent 
Scottish Government consultation was in favor of retaining the declaration of intent 
to stay in acquired gender for life, for reasons that it reflects the seriousness of the 
event: 
 
 ‘Choosing to apply for legal recognition of your acquired gender is an 
important life decision. This needs to be reflected in any new self-declaration system 
for obtaining legal gender recognition.’233 
 
This proposal is in agreement that a declaration of seriousness of intent is desirable as 
it shows that that applicant fully understands the legal consequences of the change in 
legal gender and acts as a safeguard with legal sanctions if the system is abused. 
However, there is no need for a statutory declaration to include a for life requirement. 
234 The for life requirement has little substantial effect as it does not stop people from 
                                                
231	Scottish	Government,	Review	of	the	gender	recognition	Act	2004:	A	
Consultation,	(2017),	3.26	
232	Minister	for	Women	and	Equalities,	Reform	of	the	Recognition	Act	–	
Government	Consultation.	(2018),	p.2.	
233	Scottish	Government,	Review	of	the	gender	recognition	Act	2004:	A	
Consultation,	(2017),	3.30.	
234	The	response	by	Stonewall	Scotland	to	the	Scottish	Government’s	consultation	
on	the	GRA	discusses	this.	See	Stonewall	Scotland,	Gender	Recognition	Act:	
Stonewall	Scotland	Consultation	Response,	(2018),	10.	
<https://www.stonewallscotland.org.uk/sites/default/files/gra_consultation_respo
nse_scotland_final.pdf>	[accessed	12	September	2018].		
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changing gender again given that there are no restrictions on the amount of times 
someone can apply for legal recognition. As argued in Chapters one and two, the for 
life requirement and the idea of permanence that it is based on is a mechanism by law 
to preserve and reassert the gender binary. As the aim of this proposal is to dismantle 
the binary logic of gender recognition law and to give trans* people more freedom 
and autonomy, then this requirement must go. 
 
Self-Identification and ‘becoming’ 
Chapter two demonstrated that the sex/gender binary is not a principled basis for 
recognition law and argued that the concept of ‘becoming’ was useful in re-
conceptualizing embodiment. Insights of becoming have illuminated us to the fact that 
the self is never knowable or settled, but rather it is constantly involved in processes 
of ‘becoming’. Our identities are not static; they are open-ended, variable and 
unpredictable. This alternative conception does not square with the conception of 
gender in law that is routed through a stable sex/gender binary framework. A 
‘becoming’-self forces us to think gender differently. ‘Becoming’ highlights how there 
is no truth of the self and, following this, there is no truth of gender. Therefore, there 
can be no metaphysical account of gender. In other words, the indeterminacy and 
contingency of the self means that the meaning of gender cannot be regarded as fixed 
or static but is instead constantly changing and evolving.  
 
Law’s rationale for deciding gender has up until now, relied on the presumed 
objectivity of the gender binary. That objectivity has been proven false.235 As such, 
                                                
235	See,	for	example,	A	Fausto-Sterling.	‘The	Five	Sexes’,	1993	at	p.23	and	J.	Butler,	
‘What	about	Hormones’	in	Bodies	that	Matter,	1993	at	p.10	discussed	in	detail	in	
Chapter	two.	
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gender recognition routed through the gender binary is deeply unprincipled. Trans* 
theorists have pointed this out: 
 ‘in absence of an agreement on a definitive metaphysical account of sex, states 
have an ethical responsibility to give trans* people self-identification.’236 
 
This proposal is in agreement with the above statement. Self-identification is the only 
principled way in which the state can assign gender; to do otherwise would be an 
unjustified restriction on people’s freedom and autonomy over their lives.  
 
Self - Identification and Freedom and Autonomy 
Given the lack of agreement on exactly what gender is, the current legal system that 
places ‘experts’ to decide the gender of someone is unprincipled and unduly restricts 
people’s autonomy and freedom. As Meyeda points out, for someone to force their 
own interpretive assessment of someone else’s gender upon them is ‘an infringement 
on the person’s autonomy.’237 Principle 3 of the Yogyakarta Principles similarly 
highlights the link between having one’s gender identity recognized and respecting 
their freedom and autonomy: 
 
 ‘Each person’s self-identified … gender identity is integral to their personality 
and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom.’238 
 
                                                
236	G,	Mayeda.	‘Who	do	you	think	you	are’	in	You’ve	Changed:	Sex	Reassignment	
and	Personal	Identity	(USA:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009)	at	p.201.		
237	ibid	
238	Principle	3,	The	Yogyakarta	Principles	(2007).	
https://yogyakartaprinciples.org/principle-3/	[accessed	12	September	2018]	
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It is clear that self-identification is wound up tightly with someone’s sense of liberty 
and agency. The ability to describe one’s own identity and have that validated by law 
is greatly desired and highly valued by trans* people. In a recent survey exploring 
non-binary trans*  experiences in the UK, a respondent described the privileges (that 
are so often taken for granted by identities that are not marginal) that could come with 
legal recognition: 
 
 ‘if we had legal recognition –oh my, the thought is so exciting – I wouldn’t 
have to constantly justify the nature of my existence to almost every single person I 
meet. I could be free to be who I am with public bodies, my doctor, everyone.’239 
 
Narratives like this illuminate the emotional burden that trans* people suffer daily in 
hiding or altering who they are out of fear. They also highlight the potential that a 
self-identification model has for improving the current reality of trans* lives.  
 
Place Alongside Cis Identities 
In current law trans* people are recognized in their chosen gender only if they apply 
to the GRA and satisfy certain requirements. Trans* people must commit time and 
effort if they want to be recognized for who they are. They have to allow themselves 
to be analyzed, scrutinized and often humiliated before they are awarded legal 
recognition. Cis people, on the other hand, are granted recognition automatically and 
                                                
239	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	UK.	(2016),	79	<	
https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Report-final.pdf	
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without qualification.240 This contributes to the idea that perpetuates much of society: 
that trans* people are less than that of cisgender people.  
 
A self-identification model like the one proposed here, however, recognizes all 
genders, both cis and trans*, in the same way. Neither, under this model, are required 
to subject themselves to analysis by law or medicine. A self-identification model 
which refuses to offer differential treatment in recognition between cis and trans* 
people can recognize that all identities are to be taken to be natural and paradigmatic 
genders. It recognized that differential treatment is no longer justified.241  
 
The trans* activists campaign in Ecuador, which sought to connect trans* self-
identification with cis gender self-identification, appeared to move in a similar 
direction. Ecuador trans* activists, instead of asking for rights from the state, 
proposed a system where the state would ask everyone, once they get to a certain age, 
what gender they would like to be registered as on the system. This type of system, as 
Halberstam explains, refuses to demand justification from trans* people: 
 
 ‘[it] takes the onus off the trans* person and puts it back onto the system, and 
shows us the way in which the system has presumed things that it should never have 
presumed.’242 
                                                
240	T.	Bettcher.,		‘Trans*	Woman	and	meaning	of	Women’	in	The	Philosophy	of	Sex:	
Contemporary	Readings,	6th	Ed	,	Halwani,	R	et	al.	(eds).	(London:	Rowland	and	
Littlefield,	2015)	at	p.245	
241	ibid	
242J	Halberstam,	‘Jack	Halberstam	-	Trans**:	A	Quick	and	Quirky	Guide	to	Gender	
Variance’	NYU	Florence	Youtube	Channel,	2017.	At	1h	22mins.	<	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quvWUlus6ao	>	[accessed	10	September	
2018]	
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The aim in this campaign was to create a recognition system where everyone is subject 
to the same treatment.243 Ecuador activist’s proposal is therefore an example of a 
system that is changing the terms by which gender is registered. Both cis and trans* 
identities are subject to the same gaze from the law in the activist’s proposal. It 
therefore made steps toward situating trans* and cis identities alongside each other, 
as opposed to in opposition.  
 
 
Challenges to Self-Identification 
While there are numerous advantages to the adoption of a self-identification model, 
there are also a number of challenges. When moving away from expert designations 
of identity, there are two main issues. Firstly, the effect this may have on 
discrimination law and healthcare must be considered. Secondly, there is also the 
concern that conflicts around who has the right to call themselves a particular gender 
could arise, particularly in the context of access to certain services such as access to 
safe spaces. I will show, however, that these issues can be dealt with.  
 
1. Discrimination Protections 
Gender reassignment is currently used as grounds for discrimination under the 
Equality Act 2010.244 If gender becomes self-identified, this may affect the 
protections afforded under this Act. There is no doubt that this would be undesirable: 
                                                
243	J.	Halberstam,	‘Jack	Halberstam	-	Trans**:	A	Quick	and	Quirky	Guide	to	Gender	
Variance’	NYU	Florence	Youtube	Channel,	2017.	At	1h	22mins.	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quvWUlus6ao	>	[accessed	10	September	
2018]	
244	Section	7.	
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gender, after all, will continue to be a relation of inequality notwithstanding any 
moves toward self-identification.245 It is submitted however, that discrimination 
protections can be retained. Cooper has convincingly argued that amending the GRA 
so that the state no longer assigns people’s gender will not necessarily mean that 
trans* people can no longer use gender or gender reassignment as a ground of 
discrimination.246 Cooper cites religion and sexuality as examples of areas in which 
law becomes involved when needed even though it does not assign religious or sexual 
identities to people.247 Cooper suggests that the regulation of gender can become 
similar to these domains of law and therefore de-certifying gender need not 
necessarily mean de-regulating gender. Law can continue to recognize and regulate 
gender decisions. Changes to the GRA do not mean that trans* people can no longer 
be protected from discrimination; legal tools such as the Equality Act can continue to 
be used to ground people’s claim for discrimination.248  
 
It is suggested, however, that Equality Act be amended to improve clarity. While 
changes to the GRA need not hinder trans* people’s ability to access discrimination 
protection, the increased recognition of non-binary identities proposed in this thesis 
may require the Scottish Government to discuss with the UK Government whether 
any amendments are required to the 2010 Act. 249 Although the introduction of the 
                                                
245	J.	Conaghan,	Law	and	Gender	(2013)	pp.	77-80;	V.	Munro,	Law	and	Politics	at	
the	Perimeter:	Re-Evaluating	Key	Debates	in	Feminist	Theory	(Hart	Publishing,	
2007)	pp.132-43.		
246	D	Cooper	and	F	Renz,	'If	the	State	Decertified	Gender,	What	Might	Happen	to	its	
Meaning	and	Value?	'	[2016]	43(4)	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	484.	
247	Ibid	at	p.488	
248	ibid	
249	Whilst	the	GRA	is	largely	devolved,	the	2010	Act	is	largely	reserved	and	
therefore	any	proposed	changes	to	it	will	need	to	be	discussed	with	Westminster.	
An	Order	can	be	made	under	section	104	of	the	Scotland	Act,	which	allows	UK	
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Equality Act removed the need to have medical supervision to gain protection, the 
exact scope of the Act on first reading is far from clear. It refers to ‘transsexual’ and 
‘gender reassignment’ which are outdated terms that work together to suggest that 
only post-operative trans* people are covered.250 The explanatory notes make it clear 
that this is not in fact the case.251 However, it has nevertheless created the mistaken 
belief that the Act only provides protection to post-operative trans people. 252 A 
broader definition of who is protected from discrimination would therefore make the 
responsibilities and rights under the Act clearer and more certain.  
 
2. Access to Healthcare 
Chapter one explored how the diagnosis of gender dysphoria has support among some 
trans* people. The reason being that it facilitates access to a variety of medical 
procedures that if carried out through a private route would be unaffordable to many. 
Without a medical model of transgender legal recognition, trans* people fear that 
access to health care may be adversely affected.253 In other words, if trans* specific 
treatment is founded on a psychological disorder as opposed to a desire or personal 
preference, then it is more likely to receive public funding. Surgery, for example, may 
come to be viewed as elective rather than necessary and therefore cease to be covered 
by the NHS. However, as Butler points out, there is no reason that trans*-specific 
                                                
ministers	to	make	consequential	provision	following	an	Act	of	the	Scottish	
Parliament.		
250	Minister	for	Women	and	Equalities,	Reform	of	the	Recognition	Act	–	
Government	Consultation.	(2018),	p.24.	
251	Equality	Act	2010:	Explanatory	Notes,	August	2010,	para	41-43.	Accessed	at	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/division/3/2/1/4	[accessed	
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health care should require a diagnosis.254 The elimination of gender dysphoria should 
not have to interfere with trans* specific health care. Having a disease is not a 
necessary condition of being afforded health care.255 Of course, if the GD requirement 
is to go and steps are to be made toward a self-identification model, we should first 
put in place another mechanism that allows trans* folk access to health care: 
 
‘it would be wrong to call for its eradication without first putting into place a 
set of structures through which transitioning can be paid for and legal status 
attained.’256  
 
What is argued then is that legal recognition need not be tied to trans-specific health 
care. Moreover, the NHS	must move towards incorporating a richer and more nuanced 
understanding of trans* identities, particularly fluid identities. This approach of 
changing the medical professionals approach to providing access to trans* healthcare 
will also require that doctors begin to read wider than medical accounts of trans* lives. 
257 Medical professionals must be more informed of trans* experiences. Medical 
accounts of trans* embodiment must be displaced with open trans* life stories and by 
diverse embodiments of gender.  For example, if someone changes their mind halfway 
through hormones this will no longer be scrutinized and considered to be an 
inconsistency or a mistake258  in their identity but rather as a part of their complex 
gender becoming. Medicine needs to shed it pathologizing tendencies towards trans* 
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people. The success of this, I think, depends on the effort that goes into bridging the 
gulf between how the trans* community understand their own narratives, their own 
experiences, their own bodies, and the way the other communities understands 
them.259 Increasing medical knowledge of trans* lives aside, what is clear is that 
trans* legal recognition need not be routed through a medical route.  
 
3. Access	to	Safe	Spaces	
There is a particular and specific concern around proposed changes to the GRA that 
has been taking up much of the mainstreams media’s time. The concern is that changes 
to the GRA that allow trans people to self-identify will have an adverse impact on 
women-only safe spaces (such as refuges, rape crisis centers, prisons and hospitals).260 
This view is based on some damaging misconceptions. Firstly, the process of 
obtaining a GRC is purely for the sake of updating one’s birth certificate to reflect 
one’s true gender. This process already exists and so there will be no impact on the 
access trans* women have to these spaces. Trans* people are not required to show a 
GRC on entering these spaces.  Secondly, access to spaces and services is dealt with 
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under the Equality Act, not the Gender Recognition Act. Trans* persons, already have 
a legal right, protected under the Equality Act, to access these spaces and be respected 
in their gender identity. Any changes to the GRA would not create a new right for 
trans* women, who reject medical transitions, to enter women-only spaces. 
 
Self-declaration has in fact been the basis for access to many of these spaces – rape 
crisis centers and women’s refuges - for years.261 Contrary to public and mainstream 
media fears, this has not undermined the safety of these spaces for other women. 
Rather, as LGBT charity Stonewall points out, it has enabled these services to support 
the diverse range of vulnerable women who need their services and support.262  
Indeed, many ‘women’s only spaces’ organizations, including Scottish Women’s Aid, 
Rape Crisis Scotland and Zero Tolerance, have publicly voiced their support to the 
proposal by the Scottish government to introduced self-identification: 
 
 ‘All violence against women organizations that receive Scottish Government 
funding provide trans-inclusive services. The requirement for trans inclusion plans 
has been in place for six years, and has not given rise to any concerns or challenges 
of which we are currently aware. Rather, trans women have added to our movements 
through their support, through volunteering, and as staff members of our 
organizations.’263  
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The proposed changes to the GRA in this thesis, which will allow trans* people to 
have their self-identified gender legally recognized, will not have an adverse impact 
on women-only safe spaces.  The very organizations being painted as ‘at risk’ by 
potential changes to the law already operate on a self-identification policy. The 
government needs to catch up with them. 
 
Cooper has pointed out that changes to gender recognition law will pose challenges 
for organizations: ‘changing the law so people might legally hold multiple, non-
binary, evolving gender identities creates complex and striking challenges for a range 
of bodies and activities.’ 264 While a discussion of all of these issues265 is out with the 
scope of this thesis, what is clear is that different types of organizations and bodies 
will require different and nuanced responses. Sharpe, for example, has written about 
the risk of putting trans women sexual offenders in female prisons. Her analysis shows 
that focusing on biological gender obscures the real issue and the best possible 
responses. Women prisoners are subject to violence from both cis women and trans* 
women fellow inmates and also by prisons guards. Therefore, removing trans* women 
from female prisons will not stop female prisoners being assaulted, which is surely 
the main issue. In other words, the suggestion that we ought to exclude all trans* 
women sexual offenders from female prisons masks other important issues such as 
the fact that fellow cis prisoners and prison guards also commit these offences. 
Removing trans* women from female prisons will not stop female prisoners being 
assaulted. The solution to problems like this lies not in state assigned gender status 
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which puts a blanket ban on all trans* people from certain spaces, but in proper and 
robust risk assessment of all female prisoner’s/rape crisis center attendees etc. There 
will be different responses to this issue for different institutions and organizations.  
What is clear is though is that the blunt tool of biological gender is inadequate to deal 
with these issues. Freeing access decisions from a concern over biological sex can 
allow for more principled decision making which can be informed by a clear and 
robust assessment of the present danger trans and cis women pose to others. In case 
of gender identity, organizations can recognize gender identity in ways that are more 
responsive to why it is important in that situation. While it is clear that different spaces 
and organizations will require unique responses, due to the protections of Equality 
Act, however, the number of areas where the rules of an organization or body trump 
trans* people’s gender identification will likely be very few. Currently, under the Act, 
trans* identities are protected unless covered by one of the exceptions.266 
  
Power and Privilege 
The access to spaces debates highlight that for the individual freedom of self-
identification to work, it must come together with communities that are built around 
open-reflexive-identities for recognition to be realized. In other words, for self-
identification to function properly, all identities must begin to embrace their own self 
as ‘becoming’; that is, contingent and unstable:  
 
 ‘An ability to affirm what is contingent and incoherent in oneself may allow 
one to affirm others that may or may not ‘mirror’ one’s own constitution.’267 
                                                
266	The	Equality	Act	2010,	section	7	
267	J.	Butler,	Giving	an	Account	of	Oneself	(USA:	Fordham	University	Press,	2009),	
41.	
	 123	
 
Of course, asking cis men and cis women to embrace their own self as ‘becoming’ - 
as something that is contingent and unstable - may be difficult given the investment 
and apparent privilege that many men and women receive from their stable gender 
identifications. Many cis men and women are heavily invested in, and receive 
privilege from, their gender identification and so demanding them to give it up may 
be met with opposition. Yet, it will be argued that a strict gender binary is not only 
detrimental to gender non-conforming individuals, but also to cis women and cis men. 
Both cis men and cis women have an interest in ensuring that the gender binary is 
dismantled. It does not serve either of them. Firstly, it is the gender binary and the 
idea that men and women are meaningful categories of difference which legitimizes 
women being regarded as inferior to men and therefore being treated as less than them 
(for example being subject to sexual violence and being paid less). Feminism has 
pointed out that gender is an oppressive system that produces unequal norms, ways of 
being and statuses. A social regime that has a strict binary of man and woman allows 
men to exploit the social hierarchy that exists between them to dominate and control 
women. It is the strict gender binary that ensures the continued marginalization of 
women. If women want to challenge the inequality between men and women then 
dismantling the gender binary that constitutes and sustains it should be a goal.  
 
Moreover, the power that the patriarchy promises men is false. While men as a social 
group have power, many individual men feel powerless.268 Masculinities scholarship 
has shown that the privilege that comes with being a man, by virtue of the gender 
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hierarchy - also comes with harms.269 It can therefore reinforce and strengthen the 
commitment of this proposal to deconstructing the binary.  
 
The reason for this is that masculinities, like the gender binary, is constructed. 
Masculinity is not universally felt amongst men. Privilege is not monolithic; it is 
unevenly distributed and it exists differently in varying forms and contexts. Most men, 
a lot of the time, fail to live up to the high standard of what constitutes being a man. 
Pursuing masculinity is an ongoing process that men experience and construct daily 
in establishing their place. And they will always fall short. The construction of men, 
like the construction of what it means to be trans*, is so strict and uncompromising 
that few, if any feel that they live up to it. Attributes frequently associated with being 
a man (leadership, strength, self-reliance, dominance, heroism, attraction to women) 
also come with expectations and limits that greatly affect their identities and lives. 
The self-esteem of men is firmly tied to their ability to perform masculine traits. While 
gender roles have fortunately been challenged and opposed throughout the world by 
feminist movements, patriarchal values still remain deeply embedded in our society. 
Men have internalized these gender norms that are predicated upon self-reliance and 
dominance and failure to uphold these traits fuels mental health issues. The result is 
that many men suffer fear, isolation, anxiety and anger – manifesting in, for example, 
the high suicides rate of males.270 We can convince those that currently receive some 
benefits from the gender binary that it is also causing great harms. It is in men and 
women’s best interest to support trans* efforts to dismantle the gender binary and to 
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rearrange power relationships along more equitable lines. Men and women can and 
should seek relief from the gender struggle.  
 
 
Multiple Gender Schema 
In addition to allowing people to self-identify in their chosen gender, this thesis 
proposes a system that recognizes multiple gender identifications. An increasing 
number of trans* people in Scotland gender identify beyond female or male 
classifications. 271 The current recognition model provides no recognition to these 
individuals. Amending recognition law to include non-binary identities is necessary 
to safeguard the mental, physical and emotional wellbeing of those people, to give 
them freedom and autonomy to live the gendered life of their choosing and to move 
towards social and legal equality in society between trans* and cis people.  
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Along with self-identification, the recognition of non-binary identity is becoming 
international best practice. The third gender marker of “X” has already been 
introduced in Canada272 and in New Zealand273 on official identification documents, 
including passports. California has also recently introduced non-binary recognition 
policies274 and the German Constitutional Court recently acknowledged legal 
categorization outside ‘male’ and ‘female’.275 
 
Addition of ‘X’ Identity marker 
Exactly how to include non-binary identities is challenging. One possibility is to enact 
a third or ‘X’ gender marker which can accommodate persons who do not or cannot 
self-identify as a man or woman. This is the route taken by the jurisdictions cited 
above and is the path being taken by a number of non-binary persons in Scotland who 
are currently litigating for it. 276  
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There are few issues with this route, however. Firstly, the single addition of an ‘X’ 
gender marker would be under inclusive. It would be under inclusive in the sense that 
it would be consolidating all identities outside or beyond male and female together. 
This is inappropriate as this is in fact a diverse, varied and sometimes conflicting 
group of people. One category representing all these people does not recognize the 
specificity of all the gender identities that would be subsumed under it. A respondent 
to a survey on non-binary identities summed this point up well: 
 
 ‘Only having ‘non-binary’ might not be helpful either for some people who 
may want more specific words used for their gender.’277 
 
Secondly, it would be over inclusive for the reason that many beyond the binary 
experiences, such as those that consider themselves to be fluid, explicitly reject any 
notion of fixed or stable categories. Respondents that took part in a recent study on 
the experience of non-binary people in the UK stated that they thought that having 
only three categories would not be enough.278 A marker of ‘X’ will therefore not 
represent these people in an appropriate way.  
 
Finally, while this option would achieve the aim of formally recognizing, in law, 
someone’s chosen gender, employing a third or ‘X’ category leaves the gender binary 
firmly in place at the normative centre.279 The simple addition of one additional 
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gender marker will not displace male and female as the sole paradigmatic genders. 
Individuals who are marked as ‘X’ will continue to be considered as exceptions to the 
binary rule. This is the view of Barrs who has stated that it is unlikely that the 
hierarchy of gender will be dismantled by the simple addition of a third gender. What 
is instead likely to happen is that X will continue to be considered apart and 
subordinate to male and female.280 To be awarded gender recognition and thus be 
legitimized as a member of one’s self-identified gender does not necessarily mean that 
trans* people will become accepted in society. For real transformation, legally and 
socially, a new gender recognition model must disrupt the binary and gender 
hierarchy. This will not be done if the experiences of trans* people are continued to 
be thought of as atypical and the naturalized binary is left unquestioned.  A new 
recognition system must recognize all multiple trans* identities as the norm rather 
than as exception. While a self-identification model described above will go some 
way towards remedying the pathological tendencies of the current system, this will 
not itself eliminate the image of trans* identities as exceptions to the natural binary 
rule in the public imaginary. The simple addition of an ‘X’ marker will similarly not 
do this.  
 
The third gender, or ‘X’, option highlights the difficulty of including new identities 
into the current recognition system. The radical transformation of trans* lives, legally 
and socially, will not happen unless beyond the binary identities are recognized in 
their specificity and in a way that recognizes them as full members of society, to the 
                                                
280	G.	Baars,	‘The	Politics	of	Recognition	and	the	Limits	of	Emancipation	through	
Law’,	Critical	Legal	Thinking,	2017	<	
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2017/11/30/politics-recognition-limits-
emancipation-law/	>	[accessed	10	January	2018]	
	
	 129	
same extent as cis identities. Cis identities, it is useful to remind ourselves, are 
recognized automatically and without qualification as the paradigmatic genders. They 
are exclusively the ideal, typical and natural examples of gender identities. This needs 
to change. A new recognition model, to be truly transformatory, must problematize 
the status of the normal; it must displace cis gender subject positions as the sole 
occupants of the natural and paradigmatic centre. The current normative assumptions 
of the current legal recognition model will only be disturbed by the reality of trans* 
lives if it is amended so that they too are considered to by typical, natural examples 
of gender variance. Scheman has pointed this out in her essay ‘Queering the Center 
by centering the Queer’: 
   
‘Whether or not, or to what extent, the sex/gender system is disrupted by the 
gender experiences of transsexuals depends on the extent to which those experiences 
are thought of as paradigmatic.’281 
 
The stability of cis gender identities at the centre explains why the existence and 
reality of trans* lives have continued to be explained away as exceptions or anomalies 
to the binary rule: 
 
‘In our current system, cases that do not meet the criteria of the two-sex system 
tend to remain exceptions to the rule, mere anomalies that may give us pause about 
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the accuracy of our criteria but in no way destroy the very concept for which those 
criteria are to serve as the test.’282 
 
A system that recognizes trans* lives but does so in this way will do little to improve 
their lives socially.  I will show, however, that we can include trans* identities in a 
way that situates them alongside cis identities at the normative centre. I propose a 
model that rejects the binary, hierarchies, strict divisions and borders and instead 
embraces the fluidity, ambiguousness and becoming of all identities.  
 
Multiple Gender Schema  
It is proposed that law should permit individuals to self-declare their own gender for 
legal purposes and for self-identification to not be limited to ‘male’, ‘female’ or ‘X’. 
This thesis proposes a system that acknowledges a much larger variety of identity 
categories. Principles 3 and 31 of the Yogyakarta Principles maintain that states 
should ‘take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to fully 
respect and legally recognize each person’s self-defined gender identity’ 283 and that 
‘everyone, regardless of their sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or sex 
characteristics, has the right to legal recognition and access to identity documents that 
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are true to their self.’284 Whilst international framework like this does not explicitly 
call for the inclusion of a specific number of gender identities, it is submitted that a 
large number and wide variety is necessary to ensure that people’s self-identified 
gender identity are fully ‘respected’, ‘recognized’ and ‘true to self”. Elsewhere, other 
international bodies mention the importance of including more than three options for 
people to identify with. The World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
(WPATH) released a statement in 2017 supporting the inclusion of multiple gender 
identities for legal gender recognition:  
 
‘WPATH recognizes that there is a spectrum of gender identities, and that 
choices of identity limited to Male or Female may be inadequate to reflect all gender 
identities. An option of X, NB (non-binary), or Other (as examples) should be 
available for individuals who so choose.’285 
 
Whilst there is yet to be a jurisdiction that has adopted this type of gender system, a 
multiple gender scheme was put in place by Facebook in 2014 where the company 
introduced more than 70 new gender options in the UL.286 The new gender options 
include androgynous, trans*, trans* woman, trans* man, transsexual, pangender, bi-
gender, agender, polygender, and cisgender. Significantly, Facebook has left the list 
                                                
284	International	Commission	of	Jurists.	‘The	Yogyakarta	Principles	plus	10	(YP+10)’	
(2017)	http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en/yp10/	[accessed	16	
September	2018].	
285	K	Gnudson,	‘WPATH	Identity	Recognition	Statement’	(2017)	
https://www.wpath.org/newsroom/global-impact	[accessed	16	September	2018]	
286	R	William.	‘Facebook's	71	gender	options	come	to	UK	users’,	The	Telegraph	(27	
June	2014)	
	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/10930654/Facebooks-71-
gender-options-come-to-UK-users.html	[	accessed	10	January	2018]	
	 132	
open to change, with the option for people to add genders that are not yet on the list.287 
Facebook - by creating a more descriptive, explanatory and affirming concept of 
trans* gender identities - is therefore an example of a recognition system that is 
responsive to the deconstruction of gender by feminism, queer theory and ‘becoming’.  
An open-ended list of multiple identities can be responsive to the idea of sex as being 
open-ended process, elaboration and unpredictable.288 Facebook, by allowing people 
to identify as ways beyond the binary has opened up possibilities for gendered life.  
 
Multiple Gender Scheme and ‘becoming’ 
A multiple gender is consistent with the ‘becoming’ self. In contrast to organizing 
bodies according to the sex/gender binary rule, the concept of ‘becoming’ introduced 
in Chapter two offers an alternative way to understand bodies and therefore change 
how they are categorized in law. Under the binary rule, bodies are conceptualized as 
inert, stable and passive. Under this conception, non-binary and fluid genders are 
either inconceivable or treated as exceptions to the binary rule. In contrast to this 
conception of bodies, ‘becoming’ understands all bodies as fluid, malleable and 
constantly open to change, with the boundaries and hierarchies between different 
bodies unclear and ambiguous. This can open up for the possibility of categorizing 
bodies in an alternative way.  
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288	Steven	Whittle	when	asked	to	comment	on	the	Facebook	gender	list	in	a	recent	
interview	suggested	that	more	could	be	added	and	more	still	in	future.	See	Durham	
University	‘Gender,	What	Future	Does	it	Have?	Professor	Steven	Whittle’,	
YOUTUBE	at	(1h	18m),	2015	<	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lap2DLdI8Vs	>	
[accessed	10	January	2018]	
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Bodies can be organized into more than one, two or even three categories. The 
research of Fausto-Sterling for example, has showed that we can ‘revamp our sex and 
gender system’ by dividing bodies into five sexed categories as opposed to two.289 
Her research shows that absolute binarism breaks down at the social and biological 
level. At the level of the former, she produces evidence of the existence of third, fourth 
and even fifth genders in social and cultural groups.290 In terms of the biological, she 
shows that sex is a continuum: ‘there are many graduations running from female to 
male.’ 291 
 
This continuum of gender, Sterling asserts, can be sorted into more than two 
categories. 292  Her research has shown that between and beyond the categories of 
male and female there is a significant amount of people that have mixed and matched 
primary and secondary sex characteristics.293 For example, there are people that have 
ovaries and some male genitalia.294 And there people that have testis and some female 
genitalia.295 There are actually many other ways in which typically male and female 
characteristics can be mixed and matched.296   Contrary to what the law currently 
                                                
289	A	Fausto-Sterling.	Sexing	the	Body:	Gender	Politics	and	the	Construction	of		
Sexuality.	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2000),	79.		
290	A	Fausto-Sterling.	‘The	Five	Sexes:	Why	Male	and	Female	are	not	enough.’	The	
Sciences	(New	York	Academy	of	Sciences	1993),	23.	
291	Ibid,	20.	
292	Ibid.	
293	ibid,	21.	
294	Ibid.	
295	ibid,	21.	
296	Other	examples	include	people	with,	what	is	known	as,	Androgen	insensitivity	
syndrome.	This	is	where	a	person	who	is	genetically	male	(has	one	X	and	one	Y	
chromosome)	is	resistant	to	male	hormones	(androgens).	As	a	result,	the	person	
has	some	or	all	of	the	physical	traits	of	a	woman,	but	the	genetic	makeup	of	a	man.	
See	C.F.	Sullivan	‘Gender	Verification	and	Gender	Policies	in	Elite	Sport:	Eligibility	
and	“Fair	Play”’	(2011)	Journal	of	Sport	and	Social	Issues	Vol	35	(4),	pp.	400	–	419.	
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suggests then, there are many more graduations of sex than two. Sterling talks of five 
sexes but she also says that we could have many more.297 It just depends on what 
criteria we use to distinguish and categorize.298 The reason we categorize bodies into 
two distinct sexes is not because of some biological imperative or fact but because of 
societies need to keep the order of binary gender necessary and natural: 
 
 ‘But why should we care if a ‘woman,’ defined as one who has breasts, a 
vagina, a uterus and ovaries and who menstruates, also has a clitoris larger enough to 
penetrate the vagina of another woman? Why should we care if there are people whose 
biological equipment enables them to have sex “naturally” with both men and 
woman? The answers seem to lie in a cultural need to maintain clear distinctions 
between the sexes.’299 
 
This instability of sex categories shown by researchers such as Sterling, and the 
fluidity and open-endedness of all bodies that ‘becoming’ suggests, allows us to 
explode and proliferate the categories of male and female into many more. This, 
Sterling points out, requires that ambiguity be permitted.300 An ambiguous system is 
similar to the type of system that Scheman also imagines. Drawing inspiration from 
the way in which Jewish identity is understood, Scheman imagines a sex/gender 
system that is less restrictive and less clear than the one we currently have: 
 
                                                
297	A	Fausto	Sterling,	‘The	Five	Sexes’	(2000),	24	
298	ibid	
299	ibid	
300	ibid		
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 ‘A sex/gender system in which, by contrast, not only natal members are 
paradigmatic, in which paradigm status can be shared with transsexuals, would be 
much more like the system that underwrites Jewish identity: full of ambiguity, 
unclarity, and vagueness.’301 
 
An undefined system elides the core definition of sex/gender categories and the 
boundaries that contain them. A multiple gender scheme – with its inclusion of a vast 
amount of (often overlapping) identities and which lacks any definitive criteria to 
identify as them - is muddy and deliberately ambiguous. This ambiguous and fluid 
recognition system reflects the fact that our bodies are constantly in a process of 
‘becoming’. There are advantages to having an ambiguous multiple gender scheme. 
Firstly, this type of system attends to what is being asked for by the trans community:  
 
‘There should just be a box saying ‘gender’ to which you can add non-binary, 
male, female, none etc. which means people can specify and can put how they 
identify. This would also mean that male/female won’t be considered the norm.’302 
 
This quote also highlights two further important benefits of a multiple gender scheme, 
benefits that should be the objectives of recognition law. Firstly, it demonstrates how 
the more categories we have, the more likely people will have the freedom and 
autonomy to be able to find an accurate representation of who they feel themselves to 
                                                
301	N.	Scheman,	‘Queering	the	Center	by	Centering	the	Queer’,	2011	at	p.137	
Scheman	points	out	that	what	constitutes	Jewish	identity	is	undefined:	it	is	
impossible	to	point	to	one	determinative	factor	that	makes	up	Jewish	identity.	
Rather,	but	it	made	up	of	a	cluster	of	traits.	
302	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	UK.	(2016),	74	<	
https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Report-final.pdf>	
[accessed	12	September	2018]	
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be. Additionally, the above quote also suggests how a system like this can displace 
cis identities as the sole occupants of the normative centre.  
 
Multiple Gender Scheme and Freedom and Autonomy  
Recognizing non-binary identities in their varied multitude in law is directly linked to 
trans* person’s wellbeing, freedom and autonomy and is also linked to increasing 
social acceptance and understanding towards trans* identities. With the adoption of a 
multiple gender scheme, trans* people will no longer feel the pressure to force 
themselves into categories they do not fully align with. Unlike current law or the mere 
addition of an X or third gender option, a multiple gender schema awards legal 
recognition without requiring trans* people to give up their specificity and richness. 
For example, those who identify as fluid can choose the option of identifying as 
‘fluid’, signaling to the world that they reject any notion of fixed or stable identities 
and have the legal backing to affirm this. Moreover, this system also recognizes, for 
example, non-binary, fluid gender and pangender as different (even if, overlapping) 
identities. This is in contrast to third gender option, which would assimilate all these 
three into one.  Moreover, a recognition system that does this is better equipped to 
contend with what the future may bring in terms of the increasing diversity and 
complexity of how people are understanding and choosing to identify as their gender. 
This system allows us ‘to think the future, live the future, produce a future that is 
different from the present and that can be welcomed instead of feared’.303 Finally, a 
multiple gender system that is underpinned by a conception of bodies as a multitude 
of difference as opposed to a gender binary framework, moves towards situating trans 
and cis people alongside each other.  
                                                
303	E.	Grosz,	‘Time	Travels’,	2005	p.155	
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Situate trans* Identities Alongside cis identities 
A gender scheme that is routed through binary sexual difference situates all gender 
identifications that are not male or female as exceptions to the binary rule. In contrast 
to this, multiplicities of sexual difference do not position genders that are not male or 
female as non-normative. Rather, beyond the binary identities can be thought of as 
natural instances of human variation; as paradigmatic genders alongside cis people.  
 
Refiguring the body in terms of ‘becoming’, explored in Chapter two, offered a new 
way to think about sexual difference. A continually changing and open-ended 
‘becoming’ figure understands bodies as a proliferation of differences - as a fluid and 
constant process of differentiation and movement - rather than thinking difference 
through binaries and hierarchies. Thought this way, sex/gender is opened up beyond 
the constraints of the contained, binary, and hierarchal sex difference. Gender bodies 
thought in terms of ‘becoming’, and gender categories thought in terms of 
multiplicities of difference – are not strictly demarcated. The borders between them 
are open-ended and permeable; the boundaries are fluid and shifting. The difference 
amongst the multiple categories under a system like this are therefore thought of as 
constantly changing shades of difference, as opposed to clear differences of kind.  
Considering trans* people and cis people to be differences of kind was necessary to 
situate cis people at the natural and paradigmatic centre (with trans* people on the 
outside). ‘Becoming’ allows us to make the conceptual move away from viewing these 
two groups in opposition to each other to situate trans* people alongside cis people. 
All ‘becoming’ identities can now be thought of as natural variation of human 
difference. In other words, instead of differences of kind (as they are under the binary), 
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they are considered as natural variations of each other. A model that allows people to 
self-identify in one of multiple options can recognize people in all their complexity 
and without qualification or justification. Law is sending the message to the world 
that trans* and cis people are no better, or worse, than each other and are therefore 
deserving of equal treatment in the way that their gender is recognized. This will go 
some way toward mitigating the prejudice against trans* people that currently exists 
in the social imaginary.  
 
No gender 
The scheme proposed in Ecuador, which subjected both trans and cis people to the 
same gaze, is an example of a way to eliminate the asymmetrical treatment of cis and 
trans* people by law. The self-identification and multiple gender scheme proposed in 
this thesis moves in a similar direction: it awards both cis and trans* identities legal 
recognition without qualification or justification. An alternative option to achieve the 
same aim is to remove the law’s gaze from all subjects altogether.304 This path will be 
considered but ultimately rejected.  
 
No gender would mean that gender is no longer recorded on any official ID documents 
like passports, driver’s license and birth certificates. It would also mean that gender 
specific areas of law such as parentage law, marriage law, registration law, criminal 
                                                
304	A	complete	de-certification	of	gender	has	been	proposed	by	some	academics.	
See,	for	example,	D.	Spade,	Normal	Life:	Administrative	Violence,	Critical	Trans	
Politics	and	the	Limits	of	Law	(2015,	rev.	and	exp.	edn.);	S.	Cowan,	`Gender	is	no	
Substitute	for	Sex:	A	Comparative	Human	Rights	Analysis	of	the	Legal	Regulation	of	
Sexual	Identity'	(2005)	13	Feminist	Legal	Studies,	p.	90	and	G.	Baars		‘The	Politics	of	
Recognition	and	the	Limits	of	Emancipation	through	Law’,	Critical	Legal	Thinking,	
2017	<	http://criticallegalthinking.com/2017/11/30/politics-recognition-limits-
emancipation-law/	>	[accessed	10	January	2018].	
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law and the rights of victims of crime would need to be revised.305 Given the practical 
difficulties that are to be expected in introducing a new multiple gender schema such 
as cost of new ID documents and paying fees, it could be argued the Government 
should cease to use gender to classify at all. This option would also have the additional 
bonus in that it would allow maximum fluidity and flexibility as people could live 
their gendered lives without the watchful eye of the law on them. Whilst these are 
good points, a no gender option is undesirable at the moment.   
 
Undesirable 
Gender is a source of pleasure for people. Many people are heavily invested in their 
gender and draw a lot of identification from it. Although gender causes a lot of 
problems, it is also socially important to people. What I mean by this is that our gender 
and sexual identities are important for expressing our social solidarities, sexual 
orientations, personalities, tastes, reproductive roles, and community memberships. 
306 Butler has spoken about this: 
  
‘gender can be very important to us, and some people really love the gender 
that they have claimed for themselves. If gender is eradicated, so too is an important 
domain of pleasure for many people. And others have a strong sense of self bound up 
with their genders, so to get rid of gender would be to shatter their self-hood. I think 
we have to accept a wide variety of positions on gender. Some want to be gender-free, 
but others want to be free really to be a gender that is crucial to who they are.’307 
                                                
305	Scottish	Government,	Review	of	the	gender	recognition	Act	2004:	A	
Consultation,	(2017),	Annex	J.	
306	L.	Shrage,	You’ve	Changed,	2009	at	p.184	
307	J.	Butler	‘Gender	Performance:	The	TransAdvocate	interviews	Judith	Butler’	
Transadvocate	(1	May	2014)	
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Gender is an intimate and valuable thing that people are not quite ready to give up. 
For trans* people, these sexual identities are particularly important given the fact they 
have been denied them for so long. Whilst it is true that not everything that matters 
socially needs to be registered in law,308 registering gender in law for trans* people, 
who have historically been refused it, is highly important to them.309 The GRA, in its 
current form, is a statutory declaration of trans* gender inferiority. It postulates that 
trans* people as less deserving of respect, autonomy and understanding than cis 
people. We should not forget or deny that the GRA is the remnant of a long history of 
discrimination, persecution and state disapproval of trans* people.310 It is, therefore, 
not enough to remove law’s say in all things gendered. There is long line of prejudice 
and invalidation that needs to be reversed and law suddenly going silent on the matter 
of gender recognition will not do this. Gender recognition law must change to instead 
explicitly express the fact that trans people are no worse, or better, than cis people. It 
is time for law to make a powerful and clear declaration that trans* people are nothing 
more, or less, than a natural variant of human diversity. It is time for Scotland to give 
                                                
<https://www.transadvocate.com/gender-performance-the-transadvocate-
interviews-judith-butler_n_13652.htm>	
308	For	example,	religion	and	sexuality	are	significant	social	markers	but	are	not	
registered	in	law.		
309	During	the	debates	prior	to	the	introduction	of	same-sex	marriage,	opponents	
sought	to	rely	on	the	fact	that	same-sex	couples	already	had	civil	partnership	
which,	in	effect,	granted	them	the	same	legal	rights	as	marriage	would.	Kenneth	
Norrie	has	convincingly	argued,	however,	that	the	introduction	of	same-sex	
marriage	was	needed	not	to	grant	the	material	effects	of	marriage	to	gay	people,	
but	for	the	symbolic	effect.	The	introduction	of	same-sex	marriage	sent	the	
message	to	the	world	that	gay	people	were	on	the	same	moral	standing	as	
heterosexual	couples.	See	K	Norrie,	‘Now	the	dust	has	settled:	the	Marriage	and	
Civil	Partnership	(Scotland)	Act	2014’	(2014)	Juridical	Review	135.	
310	See	Chapter	one	for	an	overview	off	the	legal	recognition	of	trans*	people	prior	
to	the	Gender	Recognition	Act.		
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trans* people what they have been asking for and to show to the world that it is a 
forward thinking and dynamic country when it comes to trans* rights.  
 
Although many do see the complete deconstruction of gender as utopian, many others, 
including even non-binary identities, do not prefer to see gender becoming a 
meaningless concept. Trans* people have fought long and hard for increased political 
power and visibility. They do not want to be denied the identifications that they have 
battled for. Many trans* narratives accord high importance to having their gender 
recognized:  
 
  ‘Legal gender recognition is important as it is a validation of who I am. When 
you are born you get your birth certificate and when you die you get your death 
certificate. People take that for granted. It follows you all through life… Legal gender 
recognition also validates you within the rest of the population. If you are seen to be 
legally recognized, then you have more legitimacy within the wider community.’311 
 
This narrative describes how recognition can often be underestimated by those who 
automatically get it. Cis people often do not see the importance of recognition as they 
have never had to do without it from law or wider society. Trans* people may no 
longer need or desire the recognition of their gender in the future once society catches 
up. But until then it is clear that trans* people want and need to be able to express and 
identify their gender and to use law to affirm this expression and identification. In a 
                                                
311	Louise	(second	name	unknown),	‘The	State	Decides	Who	I	Am:	Lack	of	
Recognition	for	transgender	people.’	Amnesty	International,	2014,	p.6.	
<https://www.es.amnesty.org/uploads/media/The_state_decide_who_I_am._Febr
ero_2014.pdf	>	,See	also	p.18,	p.30	and	p.40	for	other	testimonies	by	trans*	people	
on	the	importance	of	legal	gender	recognition.	[accessed	12	September	2018].	
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recent study on the experiences of non-binary people in the UK, 64% of respondents 
said that they would like to have their non-binary gender recognized in law.312 
Reasons cited include the effect that trans* people believe it will have on their own 
wellbeing and also on the way other people treat them. For example: 
 
‘I would feel far more comfortable if my passport, driver’s license, etc., said 
my actual gender rather than the one I was assigned at birth. The gender on them 
currently feels wrong, and I feel like having my real gender on those items would be 
a big step in making myself and others feel more comfortable with our identities, and 
in making sure people in general know about and acknowledge non-binary people.’313 
 
Since the provisions of the GRA came into force, 4,910 GRCs have been issued, at an 
average of around 300 a year.314 This number is significantly lower than all the known 
estimates of the trans population.315 Of the trans* respondents to the LGBT survey 
who were aware of the GRA process, but did not have a GRC and had never applied 
for one, only 7% said they would not be interested in getting one.316 This suggests that 
                                                
312	V.	Valentine.	Non-Binary	People’s	Experiences	in	the	UK.	(2016),	68	<	
https://www.scottishtrans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Report-final.pdf>	
[accessed	12	September	2018]	
313	ibid	
314	Minister	for	Women	and	Equalities.	Reform	of	the	Recognition	Act	–	
Government	Consultation.	(2018),	p.10.	
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/721725/GRA-Consultation-document.pdf	[accessed	12	
September	2018].	
315	See	Ibid,	Annex	E.		There	is,	at	the	moment,	no	definitive	measure	of	the	size	of	
the	trans	population	in	the	UK.	Applying	estimates	of	population	prevalence	from	
studies	in	other	countries	suggests	that	between	0.35%	and	1%	of	the	UK	
population	might	be	trans	(not	including	non-binary	people).	This	works	out	to	be	
between	200,000	and	500,000	people.		
316	ibid,	p.11.	
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it is not that legal recognition of gender needs to go completely, but the way in which 
trans* people are legally recognized that needs to change. Whilst I agree 
philosophically that a post-gender world could be ideal, it is undesirable at this 
moment in history. Trans* people have been clear that they want legal recognition of 
their gender identifications. To ignore the high percentage of trans* people who want 
legal recognition also ignores the value and power of law in realizing progressive 
change. Law can change how people view trans* people. Freedom does not come with 
complete decertification. Law can remain involved in recognizing gender 
identifications whilst at the same time allowing freedom and autonomy.  
 
Necessary intermediate steps must be taken before the law completely withdrawls 
from certifying gender. The explosion and proliferation of gender by a multiple 
gender scheme, along with a self-identification model makes the right steps towards 
post gender whilst also tending to what trans* people are asking for. As Hird points 
out, ‘appealing to a multiple gender schema may be an attempt to … tread softly 
towards, such an eventuality [of post gender].’317 
 
Conclusion 
Whilst this proposal seeks to move towards decertification by the state of gender, it 
stops short of complete de-gendering. The importance of gender in legal and social 
areas of law, particularly to trans* people, suggests that legal recognition must be 
retained. Options have therefore been discussed that show that legal recognition of 
gender must change, rather than be abolished completely. Chapter three has proposed 
changes to our current model of recognition that is compatible with the new 
                                                
317	H.	Myra,	‘Gender's	nature’,	2000	at	p.359	
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understanding of identity that ‘becoming’ brings to light. These changes include the 
introduction of both a self-identification and a multiple gender schema. The proposals 
underpinning assumptions are more in line with the reality of the way trans* people 
live their lives today, and want to live their lives. The proposal will, in effect, give 
trans* people more freedom and autonomy over how they want to live their gendered 
life and reduces the unjustified asymmetrical treatment that trans* people receive as 
compared to cis people.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
It is the ideal of authenticity, and with it the difficulty to accomplish it, the anxiety, 
the pressure, the medical and legal hegemony, that have inspired this thesis. Chapter 
one explored the legal constructs through which trans* lives are understood and 
regulated. These legal constructs contrast starkly, in many ways, with an alternative 
understanding of trans* embodiment, illuminated by the concept of ‘becoming’, 
introduced and discussed in Chapter two. The GRA, in its current form, is not able to 
account for the ever-changing subjectivities which many trans*-identified individuals 
embody every day, nor deal with the new and unpredictable subjectivities that the 
future will bring. Chapter three has proposed changes to our current model of 
recognition that are compatible with this new understanding of identity. A model that 
includes both self-identification and a multiple gender schema is suggested. It is 
believed that this type of model can better balance the need to grant crucial rights and 
protection to trans* people whilst at the same time allowing opportunity for people to 
author their own experiences. This scheme will make crucial steps towards situating 
trans* lives alongside cis lives as an instance of natural human variance and send the 
message to society that trans* people are valid and are to be respected.  
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